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ABSTRACT
This research explored the relationship between the factors of public support for military non-
combat operations and for combat operations. Three experiments each assessed how the specifics
of a situation, individual belief sets, and their combination influenced public support for the policy
options. The research found the factors influential on public support for noncombat and combat
were essentially the same, but a preference for noncombat existed after taking personal belief sets
into account. Additionally, characteristics of the situation mattered. Instrumental situation and
personal belief set elements were the most influential, but situation elements considered norma-
tively infinitely valuable, such as human lives, retained direct influence on public support even
after accounting for personal value sets.
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1. FUNDAMENTALS
1.1 Military Noncombat Operations
The United States military serves to ensure the country’s security and serves as an implement of
its foreign policy. The capabilities the military provides span the full range of military operations
and address the full spectrum of conflict according to Department of Defense Office of the Chair-
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (2011). As a result, when confronting a crisis American leaders
have the capability to address it using combat or noncombat operations1. Noncombat operations
are a large and broad category of under-studied military endeavors. They are distinct from combat
operations. The core capability necessary for combat operations is violent war fighting, while the
core capability of noncombat operations is the delivery of capacity enhancement absent the need
for violence.
Most people have some concept of the nature of combat operations, but noncombat operations
require more explanation. Such operations fall into two broad categories: humanitarian operations
and national security-related capacity building operations. Humanitarian operations generally re-
fer to actions taken to respond to or prevent the consequences of disasters and actions to provide
other civic aid.2 Examples of humanitarian operations include the United States’ responses to the
2010 earthquake in Haiti, Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE, and the 2011 tsunami in Japan, Oper-
1The Department of Defense lexicon is constantly changing. As a result, "noncombat operations" is included in
of Defense Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (2017), but it has no specific definition. It is possible to
infer a separation between combat and noncombat operations using information from Department of Defense Office
of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (2011) and the Department of Defense Office of the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff (2017). The first indicates distinctions between combat operations and other types including
humanitarian operations, peace operations, defense support to civil authorities, foreign internal defense (a training
mission), stability activities, security cooperation, and several others. The second references noncombat in describing
situations not related to direct combat engagement with an adversary. Given this context, it is appropriate to use
noncombat operations as a general term to encompass the range of military missions other than those intended to
apply violence directly to an adversary.
2These efforts differ from combat operations conducted to respond to human atrocities, such as genocide. In those
cases, the core capability the military provides is violent war fighting, despite the justification for its execution being
humanitarian. The 2011 actions of the coalition against Libya, Operation ODYSSEY DAWN, provide an example of
such a situation.
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ation TOMODACHI. National security-related capacity building, the other category of noncombat
operations, improves the capabilities of foreign countries of security interest to the United States.
Generally, the capacity building efforts relate to training and exercises, institutional process im-
provement, or the procurement of higher capability equipment. One example of these efforts in
response to an international crisis was the increase in military aid to Israel during and following
the October 1973 War. In fiscal year 1974, which included October of 1973, the United States
provided Israel with $983 million in military loans and $1.5 billion in military grants according
to Sharp (2010). As Gutfeld and Zumbrunnen (2013) documented, much of the aid came during
Operation NICKEL GRASS, the effort to airlift arms and equipment from the United States to
Israel during the war.
The scope and breadth of noncombat operations is significant. A recent accounting of De-
partment of Defense efforts toward building partner capacity resulted in identifying 173 separate
programs (Government Accountability Office (2017)). Serafino (2014) found the budget for one
type of aid, Security Assistance Reform, was $314 million slated to 29 countries. Finally, the De-
partment of Defense spent $104 million in 2012 on humanitarian relief and civic aid according to
the latest available information (Department of Defense (2013)). Despite the expense of combat
efforts dwarfing those of noncombat operations, these numbers indicate noncombat operations are
important and warrant efforts to understand them.3
The United States spends personnel, wealth, and other resources on the conduct of military
noncombat operations. The United States, however, does not respond to every humanitarian crisis
nor does it provide training, equipment, or funding to every potential suitor4. It is possible pub-
lic support for such operations influences decision makers. If so, it is worth understanding what
3Combat is expensive in terms of human costs and financial ones. Different scholars use different methods to
calculate costs, but Daggett (2010) identified $1.1 trillion in specific post-9/11 operations appropriations through 2010
and Crawford (2016) calculated the 2016 costs of post-9/11 operations at $4.6 trillion when including the long-term
requirement to support war veterans. Many scholars consider the costs of violent conflict so high only the irrational or
ill-informed would participate (Fearon (1995)).
4The United States is also selective in its involvement in conflict.
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factors drive public support for noncombat operations and if the factors of support for noncombat
operations differ from those of combat operations.
1.2 Literature Review
Literature on the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy provided the back-
ground for this research. Scholars have studied both the general relationship between public opin-
ion and foreign policy and the specific relationships between public opinion and foreign aid or
conflict. Conceptually, noncombat operations exist in an unexamined space between them. At its
essence, the primary outcome of foreign aid is helping another while the primary outcome of con-
flict is compelling another. The capabilities to provide assistance to foreign military and civilian
development exist within the U.S. military. Abilities as diffuse as building hospitals, training law
enforcement, and training foreign military forces are within the portfolio available for a noncombat
response to a crisis. The existing gap in knowledge relates to the public support of the use of the
military to provide assistance, as it does during noncombat operations, rather than as an instrument
of violence.
1.2.1 Public Support and Foreign Policy
Research relating American public support and foreign policy decisions has undergone several
evolutions. Theory from the 1950s and 1960s coalesced into what Holsti and Rosenau (1979) re-
ferred to as the Almond-Lippmann Consensus. Three expectations defined the consensus. First, the
opinions of the public on foreign affairs were irrelevant to decision makers (Almond (1950)). Sec-
ond, the public’s opinions were volatile and subject to manipulation (Lippmann (1955)). Finally,
the public’s opinions were so incoherent as to defy characterization into a generalizable position
(Converse (1964)). Together these expectations disconnected foreign policy from the masses for
many scholars.
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Later scholars questioned these expectations and found their universality did not necessarily
hold. In the second generation of research, scholars found deeper understanding of foreign af-
fairs in the public than the expectations indicated. Verba et al. (1967) found some level of rational
cost-benefit processing occurred in the public’s positions, while Mueller (1973) found evidence the
public explored the value of alternative outcomes for foreign affairs events. The third generation of
research found more specific evidence against the Almond-Lippmann expectations. Holsti (1992)
found the public’s positions to be coherent and Jentleson (1992) found the positions rationally re-
flected a cost-benefit framework.
Some researchers expected the public was ill-informed until elites provided it the information
necessary to form opinions on foreign affairs. Under this model, political elites led the public to
its positions on foreign affairs (Brody and Shapiro (1989); Brody (1991); Zaller (1992); Lippmann
(2017)). Examples countering the theory of elite-driven opinion exist. During the period before
the Iraq War elites and the media were consistent in their support for action, but a sizable portion
of the U.S. population was against the war (Hayes and Guardino (2010, 2011)). In another case,
Enns (2014) found political leaders did not shape public opinion, but followed their constituents
on incarceration policy. Situations wherein the public holds positions different from elites are a
challenge to the elite-driven construct.
Recent studies found evidence of a more independent public opinion formation process than
the elite-driven model would expect. Kertzer and Zeitzoff (2017) found a bottom-up process of
opinion formation occurred on foreign policy issues5. The mechanism they identified was the so-
cial nature of opinion formation. They, along with Druckman and Nelson (2003) and Klar (2014),
found the social environment of individuals, conversations among peers, influenced policy prefer-
ence more than partisan cues.
5Several other studies found a bottom-up process for domestic concerns (Saeki (2013); Enns (2014)).
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Mass media is another possible source for the public’s opinion of foreign policy. Some studies,
including Lippmann (2017), Bennett, Lawrence and Livingston (2006), and Brody (1991) indi-
cated the media act as conduit for the opinions of political leaders. Other research by Baum and
Potter (2008a) found the media to be strategic actors with some independence from political elites
when shaping public opinion. Recent research, however, demonstrated the relationship is more
complicated than a unidirectional media-to-public model would suppose. In some research, social
media provided the mechanism for generating independence from media elites. Lee et al. (2014)
found social media users to have access to a broad range of ideas and opinions on political topics.
In opposition to expectations social media users would select politically confirmatory sources and
groups, users more involved in political and news-related topic discussions had more politically
diverse social networks. Among those involved in discussions, those most active tended to be
more highly polarized than those less active, but the less polarized still had equivalently diverse
networks. These findings on the diversity of information available to the public were important
because Baum and Groeling (2010) found the public formed its own opinions as information asym-
metry between it and elites decreased6.
Public support for foreign affairs matters to political leaders. Fiorina (1981) and Abramson,
Aldrich and Rohde (1990) found the public used foreign affairs performance in determining its
support of political leaders. For example, following Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE, the ef-
fort to provide assistance to countries harmed by the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004, Gallup and
Newport (2006) showed President Bush had a 75% approval rating on his handling of the situation
while his overall job approval rating was 52%. The tsunami relief was the area in which the presi-
dent scored the highest approval and the overall approval level was 3% higher than the poll taken
just before the event three weeks earlier. The accumulated research indicates the public is not only
aware of foreign affairs, but also has some sophistication in its knowledge and uses its expectations
6This experiment research provided the information to participants directly without reference to a source. As a
result, the question of the independence of public opinion from political or media elite influence is not a concern.
Such a question would be fertile ground for future research into the public support of combat and noncombat military
operations.
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about foreign affairs to assess politicians.
1.2.1.1 Public Support for Foreign Aid
Generally, foreign aid efforts fall into one of two categories: humanitarian assistance and official
development aid (ODA). According to the United Nations Office of Humanitarian Coordination,
the definition of humanitarian assistance is as follows:
Aid that seeks, to save lives and alleviate suffering of a crisis affected population.
Humanitarian assistance must be provided in accordance with the basic humanitarian
principles of humanity, impartiality and neutrality, as stated in General Assembly Res-
olution 46/182. In addition, the UN seeks to provide humanitarian assistance with full
respect for the sovereignty of States. Assistance may be divided into three categories -
direct assistance, indirect assistance and infrastructure support - which have diminish-
ing degrees of contact with the affected population. (World Health Organization and
others (2008))
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) similarly defines human-
itarian aid as "action (that) saves lives, alleviates suffering and maintains human dignity following
conflict, shocks and natural disasters." (Humanitarian Assistance (N.d.))
Hynes and Scott (OECD Publishing, 2013) stated the definition of ODA has changed over
time. From its beginnings in 1963, however, ODA has maintained three essential characteristics:
a primary motivation to develop the recipient, a character of official assistance from a donor gov-
ernment, and some level of concession from the donor. In both humanitarian and ODA cases, the
intent of the assistance is to improve the situation regardless of whether it is acute or chronic.
Research on the influence of public support on foreign aid indicated foreign aid suffers from
a challenge. Smillie (1999) described public support for foreign aid as being "a mile wide and
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an inch deep." Public support is often wide spread, but commitment to foreign aid is low. This
challenge is important because evidence exists relating public support levels to consequences for
foreign aid procurement. Smillie (2003) argued soft support for foreign aid can result in reduc-
tions of aid without significant political repercussions. Collier (2008) also argued different levels
of public support can influence both the type and amount of aid donor states provide. Given these
facts, it is important to understand what factors influence public opinion on foreign aid.
Three trends driving public support emerged from the literature. The first was moral. The abil-
ity to empathize and sympathize influenced support. Scholars have found recognition of genuine
need, a spirit of generosity, and a commitment to altruism each to increase public support for for-
eign aid (Mosley (1985); Otter (2003); Fink and Redaelli (2011); Paxton and Knack (2012)). The
second trend related to an individual’s perception of the characteristics of the players involved in
the situation. Chong and Gradstein (2008) and Paxton and Knack (2012) found attitudes toward
recipients (the other), a perception of the inefficiency of one’s own government (the primary actor),
and political spectrum position (self) each influenced public support for foreign aid. Specifically,
negative impressions of the recipient of aid reduced support for providing aid as did a perception
the donor’s government is inefficient and political conservatism. The third trend included practical
justifications for supporting foreign aid. They included the strategic importance of the recipient
country, the potential for the recipient country to become an economic partner, and the ability
to absorb the financial costs of aid as a function of the donor country’s income level or wealth
(Otter (2003); Fink and Redaelli (2011); Paxton and Knack (2012); Milner and Tingley (2013)).
These broad trends provided insight on how the public determined its support for assisting another
through foreign aid.
1.2.1.2 Public Support for Involvement in Military Conflict
Just as with foreign aid, public support is relevant to decisions on American participation in
military conflict operations. Audience cost arguments indicate public opinion generally influences
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political leaders, those responsible for such decisions in a democracy (Fearon (1994, 1997); Tomz
(2007); Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999)). Knecht and Weatherford (2006) found the public’s atten-
tion to an issue influenced specific processes decision makers use in coming to a conclusion. More
specific scholarship found the influence of public opinion on the conflict decisions of democratic
leaders (Fearon (1994); Baum (2004); Baum and Potter (2008b)). Beyond the initial decision to
employ the military, public support is critical to sustaining the effort (Summers (1995)). Finally,
studies have shown the level of support for military missions influences presidential and congres-
sional approval ratings (Haar (2015); Hildebrandt et al. (2013)).
Evidence exists that public support for military combat operations follows the same trends as
for foreign aid. The moral trend manifested in the research of several scholars. Gelpi, Feaver
and Reifler (2009) found the justification for a military operation influenced support. When the
public determined the actions to be just, support increased. Relatedly, several scholars found the
"principal policy objective (PPO)" of a mission to be one of the vital factors for determining public
support for combat operations. Public support was significantly lower when the PPO was to initiate
an internal change of the foreign nation’s regime, an act seen as aggressive, than it was for objec-
tives related to doing what is right, such as for humanitarian interventions, or when necessary to
restrain a belligerent’s aggressive foreign policy (Jentleson (1992); Jentleson and Britton (1998);
Oneal, Lian and Joyner (1996); Eichenberg (2005); Nincic (1997)).
Characteristics of the players involved factored into the public support for military combat op-
erations as well. Similarly to other political questions, an individual’s partisan identification on a
spectrum between Democrat and Republican indicated preferences for the use of force in research
by Kane and Norpoth (2017); and Hetherington and Suhay (2011). Russett and Nincic (1976)
addressed how the identity of the country in need, the other, influenced support for military actions
in that country’s defense.
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Finally, a practical trend exists in the determination of public support for combat operations.
Several studies indicated human and financial costs influence support for military operations, al-
though the precise balance between the types of costs is unknown (Gartner and Segura (1998);
Eichenberg (2005); Flores-Macías and Kreps (2015); Miller and Barber IV (2016); Gelpi, Feaver
and Reifler (2009)). Expectations about the level of success an operation will have also influenced
support (Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler (2006, 2009); Eichenberg (2005); Gartner (2008)). These prac-
tical factors indicate the rational cost-benefit calculation Jentleson (1992) would have expected as
well as the rational expectations about success Gartner and Gelpi (2016) discussed.
1.3 Framework
Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler (2009) provided the initial conceptual framework for this research.
In their original construction, the interaction of the expectation of success and moral rightness of
action influenced casualty tolerance7. The extension in Figure 1.1 shows their later development
using public support as the element of the model being explained and the contingent influence of
casualty tolerance resulting from inclusion of success expectations in the model.
Figure 1.1: Extended Version of the Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler (2009) Framework
7They also included demographics, education level, and political party in their original model.
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The Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler (2009) framework included factors related to cost-benefit pro-
cessing, but also included values-based elements. Consistently in their research, Gelpi, Feaver and
Reifler (2009) found both cost-benefit and value factors mattered to the determination of support
for conflict or for leaders. In their words:
Our central argument is that—within the cost-benefit framework—when it comes to
supporting an ongoing military mission in the face of a mounting human toll, expecta-
tions of success matter the most. Many factors—the stakes, the costs (both human and
financial), the trustworthiness of the administration, the quality of the public consen-
sus on the foreign policy goal in question, and so on—affect the robustness of support.
But the public’s expectation of whether the mission will be successful trumps other
considerations. When it comes to voting on a president who has led the country into a
costly war, the relative weights of factors shift; expectations of success still matter, but
the most important factor appears to be whether the public views the initial decision
to start the war as correct.
1.3.1 Generalized Framework
The Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler (2009) model was potentially one example of a more general-
ized model incorporating elements of a situation and factors intrinsic to an individual to determine
a policy preference. The specifics of the situation under consideration, casualties and associated
tolerance in the Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler (2009) case, can have direct influence on preferences,
but other factors intrinsic to the individual can also have influence. Individuals bring a personally
held belief set of norms, ideological worldview, and acceptable cost-benefit trade-offs to bear on
the policy preference process. In the Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler (2009) model, both the expectation
of success and the assessment of the moral rightness of acting were elements of the personal belief
set. While both the situation and a personal belief set can have direct influence, their combination
can also generate contingent influence.
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Operating within the general framework, are substructures the work of Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler
(2009), Tetlock (1986), and George (1979) described. The relationship between the direct influ-
ence of a personal belief set, the direct influence of the situation, and their contingent influence on
policy preference can explain both the findings of Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler (2009) and the exis-
tence of the trends found in the literature on public support for conflict and for foreign aid.
Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler (2009) based their work on tolerance for casualties, but others have
based research squarely on values. Tetlock (1986) explored how value pluralism influenced deci-
sion making. He argued a hierarchy of values existed in individuals and the relative importance of
values in conflict led to different policy preferences; the more important value tended to predict the
preferred policy. Leveraging one of Tetlock’s examples, an individual may value both individual
freedom and social equality. For conservatives, he argued, individual freedom was a more impor-
tant value thus the conservative would prefer lower taxes to income redistribution. One important
implication of his research was recognizing people bring more than rationalist calculation to the
process of forming preferences. A personal belief set related to worldview, norms, and the situa-
tion shape the rational cost-benefit calculation.
Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler (2009) used two aspects of a personal belief set in their research, the
expectation of success and the moral rightness of taking action. One way to conceptualize a per-
sonal belief set is through operational code beliefs. Using such an operationalization can allow the
unpacking of the personal belief set influencing public support. George (1979) argued operational
code beliefs form a basis for cognitive processing of political information. Two types of operational
code beliefs exist, instrumental and philosophical. Instrumental are about how politics operate, the
"ends-means relationship in the context of political action." George (1969) argued instrumental
operational code beliefs related the best approach for selecting goals for political action; how to
pursue those goals most effectively; how the individual calculates, controls, and accepts risks for
political actions; and what is the utility and role of different means in political action. In the Gelpi,
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Feaver and Reifler (2009) framework, the expectation of success related to the utility of means and
thus reflected an instrumental operational code belief.
Philosophical operational code beliefs are concerned with what an individual normatively val-
ues or believes is inherent in the nature of politics. George (1969) argued the philosophical op-
erational code beliefs addressed "assumptions and premises he (a leader) makes regarding the
fundamental nature of politics, the nature of political conflict, the role of the individual," etc. He
argued questions related to an individual’s perspective on the essential nature of political life, the
prospects for realizing political values, and how much control or mastery over historical devel-
opment individuals have formed the philosophical operational code beliefs. The moral rightness
of acting in Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler (2009) related to the prospects for realizing political values
(doing the right thing in this case), thus represented a philosophical operational code belief.
The framework of this paper began with Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler (2009). They argued the
cost-benefit model generally applied, but additional factors also influenced public support. An
understanding of Tetlock (1986) allowed incorporation of a pluralistic values structure, a personal
belief set, into the model as the additional factors. Operationalizing the values as philosophical
and instrumental operational code beliefs unpacked the personal belief set and enabled exploration
of the influence of the different belief types on the costs and benefits of a situation. Figure 1.2
provides the generalized conceptual model of public support for a policy including the relationship
between the situation and the individual’s personal belief set.
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Figure 1.2: Conceptual Model of the Influence of the Situation and a Personal Belief Set on Public
Support. Adapted from Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler (2009).
This model allows improved assessment of public support by generalizing and expanding the
Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler (2009) framework. The expansion allows exploration of several aspects
for which the previous framework did not account. First, it enables exploration of the endogeneity
between the situation and the personal belief set through the experiment process. The researcher
can examine how beliefs influence the situation factor influence by presenting the situation first or
the influence of the situation on beliefs by assessing beliefs first8. Second, it allows a researcher to
ensure the situation and personal belief set each have unique influence on public support9. Third,
it reveals what situation factors remain influential after accounting for beliefs.
The difference between philosophical and instrumental operational codes provided the key to
understanding whether cost-benefit or value-based personal belief set factors will retain influence
from the situation. According to the Sacred Value Protection Model (SVPM) of Tetlock (1986)
more important values will define preferences. Applying the logic to the situation factors, the fac-
8This research followed the Situation->Personal Belief Set->Public Support path by presenting the situation to the
participants first then conducting mediation analysis on the Situation factors.
9This research used the first two models of each experiment to establish unique influence
13
tors related to important values will retain influence despite the inclusion operational code belief
variables.
Modeling to tease out the relationships required multiple steps. The first step was to model the
situation to determine if the overall situation factors had influence. This model represented the
direct influence of situation factors on public support. The second step was to identify variables
related to the philosophical and instrumental operational code beliefs of a personal belief set and
model their direct influence on public support. Finally, combining the models allowed assessment
of the contingent influence of situation factors on public support.
1.4 Research Plan
This dissertation leveraged three survey experiments to explore the situation factors affecting
support for different responses to an international crisis.10, 11 The policy options under investiga-
tion were either a combat or noncombat response to an international crisis. Experimental con-
trol allowed the researcher to create the situation about which the participant answered questions.
This process allowed the researcher to precisely introduce variation in the factors of interest. The
method allowed specific determination of the existence of influence on the dependent variable by
the factor under investigation. Each of the three experiments assessed a different aspect of the
generation of support. The first experiment examined how costs and benefits influence the support
for an action and how they influence the type of action, combat or noncombat operations, the par-
ticipants prefer. The second experiment then assessed the influence of the moral justification for
action and how the relationship between the recipient and the participants influenced support and
the preference for a response type. Finally, the third experiment assessed several specific factors
10The dissertation does not address several the factors potentially related to support for using noncombat operations
to pursue American interests. Among the concepts available for future research are: the relationship between infor-
mation sources and support, the political environment, and the influence of international organizations such regional
security organizations on support.
11The Texas A&M University Institutional Review Board approved the experiment including the treatments and
survey questions under approval number IRB2017-0859D.
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related to the public support of non-combat operations in particular.
Experiments require both internal and external validity. Internal validity concerns whether the
results found can be causally attributed to the experiment factors. Cook, Campbell and Shadish
(2002) and Morton and Williams (2010) discussed three elements of internal validity: construct
validity, causal validity, and statistical validity. Construct validity relates to the link between the-
ory and the inferences resulting from the experiment. The hypotheses in each experiment derive
from established theories. Results consistent with the theories would provide evidence of con-
struct validity. The between-subjects orthogonal experimental design provides a strong argument
for attributing any differences in results to the experimentally manipulated factors. Statistical va-
lidity results from a combination of methods. First, the experiment included random assignment
into treatments once a participant chose to take the survey. Assuming any uncontrolled biasing
element is normally distributed in the participants, the random assignment of participants to treat-
ments ensures the individual bias cannot influence the results. The experiments also included
questions designed to determine if the participants understood the differences between the factors
under control, manipulation checks. Significant differences between the levels of the experimen-
tally controlled variables or significant differences for the manipulation check questions provide
evidence for statistical validity. Combined, these elements of the experiments provide ample evi-
dence of internal validity for the experiments.
External validity relates to how generalizable the experiment results are and results from the
strength of the linkage between the predictions of theory and the results of repeated experiments
(Morton and Williams (2008)). The hypotheses for each experiment were grounded on established
theories. Multiple experiments with results consistent with the founding theories would bolster the
external validity of each experiment. Each consistent result strengthens the previous results until
the concepts are accepted as externally valid.
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Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) program connected researchers to participants. Researchers
required participants to be from the United States, past their eighteenth birthday, and able to read
English. Amazon’s program only allowed qualified personnel access to the recruitment informa-
tion. Initial recruitment of participants was through a simple advertisement indicating the title and
general requirements of the survey. If the potential participant indicated interest in completing the
survey, he or she next saw a detailed, Institutional Review Board-approved recruitment statement
and information sheet explaining the research and its possible benefits and consequences.
The result of the MTurk recruitment process was a convenience sample. Concerns exist about
the quality of data produced by online surveys, but Ramsey et al. (2016) found MTurk work-
ers comparable to undergraduate research participants in item recognition accuracy and attentive-
ness. They also found MTurk workers more likely to read survey instructions. Studies by Bentley,
Daskalova and White (2017) and Kees et al. (2017) found responses from MTurk to be reliable and
comparable to professional data collection services for studies of marketing and advertising. Such
research gave confidence in the quality of survey results MTurk workers produced.
After choosing to continue to the survey, participants in each experiment received a random
assignment into one of eight treatments. Researchers required each survey participant to read a
short scenario and answer several questions about his or her level of support for the operation, the
factors related to determining the level of support, and demographic information. Each participant
received appropriate compensation for their approximately 10-minute effort.
1.4.1 Nesting of Experiments
Each of the three experiments explored a different aspect of public support. The first experi-
ment focused on cost-benefit factors. The second experiment focused on value-based factors. The
third experiment addressed the elements of support for non-combat operations once leaders chose
them as the means to address a crisis.
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1.4.2 Experiment 1 - The Influence of Costs and Benefits
The first experiment explored how the cost and benefit aspects of a situation influence the sup-
port of combat and non-combat operations. The experiment manipulated the response to an inter-
national crisis as being either combat or noncombat, the response’s cost type as being primarily
human (casualties) or financial, and its probability of success as being high or low. Appendix A
includes the scenarios and survey questions used in the experiment.
Figure 1.3: Influence of the Cost-Benefit Factors on Support
Analysis of the experiment data proceeded in four steps. The base model of the experiment de-
termined if the experiment factors or any interaction of them influence support. A combination of
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) and linear regression provided information on the strength and sig-
nificance of the factors’ influence. The second step of the analysis was to use factor analysis based
on additional questions in the survey to identify latent elements of a personal belief set; philo-
sophical operational code beliefs, instrumental operational code beliefs, and ideology. The third
step was to demonstrate the influence of the resulting variables on public support using regression
analysis. The final step required combining the models using regression analysis to determine the
contingent influence of situation factors.
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1.4.3 Experiment 2 - The Influence of Values in Support
The second experiment explored the influence of values on the generation of support for combat
and non-combat operations. The experiment manipulated the response to an international crisis as
being either combat or noncombat, how sympathetic to the country of interest the participant was
by presenting different levels of victimization in the situation, and the relationship between the
country of interest and the United States as being friendly or challenging12. Appendix B includes
the scenarios and survey questions used in the experiment.
Figure 1.4: Influence of Values-Based Factors on Support
Analysis of the experiment data again proceeded in four steps. The base model of the ex-
periment determined if the experiment factors or any interaction of them influence support. A
combination of ANOVA and linear regression provided information on the strength and signifi-
cance of the factors’ influence. The second step of the analysis was to use factor analysis based on
additional questions in the survey to identify latent elements of a personal belief set; philosophical
operational code beliefs, instrumental operational code beliefs, and ideology. The third step was
to demonstrate the influence of the resulting variables on public support using regression analysis.
The final step required combining the models using regression analysis to determine the contingent
12The purpose of sympathy generation is to assess the influence of the latent concept of morality on the decisions
in the experiment.(Eisenberg (2000); Batson et al. (1997))
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influence of situation factors.
1.4.4 Experiment 3 - Inside Support for Noncombat Operations
Rather than examining the differences between support for combat and noncombat, the third
experiment explored the nature of public support after leaders chose noncombat operations in re-
sponse to a crisis. The scenarios provided a contrast of purpose for the operation, humanitarian
contrasted with national security interest; high and low costs; and different government functions
as assistance recipients, military or civilian institutions. Inclusion of the recipient factor tied to
the trend for characteristics of the other to have influence on public support in both foreign aid
and conflict literature. It is possible the public would consider military-to-military relationships as
the only acceptable role for the U.S. military’s interaction with the recipient country. The public
may view aiding civilian elements as being outside the military’s purview. The public may deem
such missions more appropriate for other governmental elements such as the Department of State
or the U.S. Agency for International Development. Finally, concerns regarding the militarization
of the relationship the United States has with foreign civilian governments may influence sup-
port (Krahenbuhl et al. (2011); SCHR Position Paper on Humanitarian-Military Relations (2010)).
Some evidence indicates the public has uneasiness with developing foreign civilian capabilities,
"nation-building," by the U.S. military. Polls from Pew Research Center, Washington, D.C. (2011)
and Rasmussen Public Polling (2016) found support for such missions to be 45% and 28% re-
spectively.13 Including the factor provided an opportunity to explore whether the difference is
important. Appendix C includes the scenarios and survey questions used in the experiment.
13The Pew poll asked "In Afghanistan and Iraq, the military has been asked to engage in noncombat missions
like reconstruction and operations designed to strengthen the country’s social, political and economic institutions,
sometimes called "nation building." Do you think these are appropriate roles or inappropriate roles for the military?"
while the Rasmussen poll asked "The United States in both the George W. Bush and Obama administrations has
pursued a foreign policy that includes a more aggressive effort to establish democracies in Middle Eastern countries
by use of the U.S. military and U.S. financial support. This policy is commonly referred to as nation building. Do you
favor or oppose the U.S. government continuing its nation-building efforts?"
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Figure 1.5: Specific Factors Influencing Non-Combat Operations
Once again, analysis of the experiment data proceeded in four steps. The base model of the
experiment determined if the controlled factors or any interaction of them influence support. A
combination of ANOVA and linear regression provided information on the strength and signifi-
cance of the factors’ influence. The second step of the analysis was to use factor analysis based on
additional questions in the survey to identify a latent element of a personal belief set; instrumental
operational code beliefs. Ideological and philosophical operational code beliefs information was
not available in the third experiment’s survey. The third step was to demonstrate the influence of
the resulting variables on public support using regression analysis. The final step required combin-
ing the models using regression analysis to determine the contingent influence of situation factors.
1.5 Expectations
Three broad expectations result from the previous discussion of theory. First, each situation
factor has its own theoretically justified expectation for having influence on public support in the
pure experiments. Combat should be less popular than noncombat. In the first experiment, human
costs and lower success should decrease public support regardless of the policy option selection.
In the second experiment, friendly relations and a high-sympathy situation should increase public
support for either combat or noncombat. Finally, in the third experiment, a humanitarian purpose
and military recipients should increase public support while high costs decrease it. The second
expectation if for both instrumental operational code belief variables, those related to pragmatic
elements of preference formation, and philosophical operational code belief variables, those relat-
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ing a current situation to an internally-held ideal, should influence public support of an action. The
final expectation is for those situation factors closely tied to identifiable values will remain signif-
icant despite the inclusion of potentially mitigating elements. Situation factors related to saving
human lives and indicating a close relationship will have influence beyond that explained by the
elements in the model conceptually related to them.
1.6 Contributions
This research adds several contributions to the current International Relations literature. First,
it provides insights into the relationship between the public support for combat and the public
support for noncombat when responding to an international crisis. Second, it expands the Gelpi,
Feaver and Reifler (2009) framework to include how a personal belief set influences the preference
for a response. Finally, it leverages operational code belief logic to explore what types of situation
factors remain influential after accounting for a personal belief sets.
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2. THE INFLUENCE OF COSTS AND BENEFITS
2.1 Experiment on Costs and Benefits Factors
The first experiment explored how cost and benefit factors of a situation influenced the public
support of a U.S. military operation. Exploration of research into public support for foreign policy,
particularly foreign aid and conflict, indicated three trends occur in both. One of those trends was
practical. For foreign aid, the strategic importance of the recipient country, the potential for the
recipient country to become an economic partner, and the ability to absorb the financial costs of aid
as a function of the donor country’s income level or wealth influenced public support (Otter (2003);
Fink and Redaelli (2011); Paxton and Knack (2012); Milner and Tingley (2013)). Expected suc-
cess and costs influenced public support for participation in conflict (Gartner and Segura (1998);
Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler (2006); Eichenberg (2005)). Should the practical trend continue for non-
combat operations, the level of success of an operation would change the public support it receives.
Under the practical trend costs should also influence public support, but the type of cost may
matter due to another trend, morality. In foreign aid research, recognition of genuine need, a spirit
of generosity, and a commitment to altruism each increased public support (Mosley (1985); Otter
(2003); Fink and Redaelli (2011); Paxton and Knack (2012)). In conflict research, the justifica-
tion for action and policy objective pursued influenced public support. Action the public saw as
justified or a policy objective to intercede on humanitarian grounds or to restrain an aggressive act
found increased public support (Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler (2009); Jentleson and Britton (1998);
Oneal, Lian and Joyner (1996); Eichenberg (2005)). According to Tetlock et al. (2000) and con-
sistent with Miller and Barber IV (2016), placing human costs, considered infinitely valuable, in
contrast with financial costs will result in different levels of public support.
It is possible the trends exist because of the influence of the personal belief set of an individual.
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Tetlock (1986) argued individuals bring values to bear when forming preferences. Those could be
based on philosophical and instrumental operational code beliefs leading to normative and prag-
matic influences beyond the specifics of the situation. If so, they would have influence on public
support separately from the factors of the situation and could alter the influence of situation factors.
2.2 Experimental Design
The first experiment explored the influence of costs and benefits on the public support for com-
bat and noncombat responses to an international crisis generated. The research used a 2x2x2
between-groups factorial experimental design to vary the type of crisis response, the probability
of success, and the type of cost. Each participant received one of eight treatments after random
assignment to it.
Figure 2.1: Influence of the Rational Factors on Support
2.3 Experiment Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: Higher probabilities of success will generate more support than lower probabili-
ties of success.
Rational choice expectations led to the first hypothesis about how the factors influence support
for the mission. In terms of rational decision making, higher probabilities of success equate to
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more benefit. As a result, all else being equal, participants will prefer to support success.
Hypothesis 2: Human costs will generate less support than financial costs.
Norms reflective of philosophical operational code beliefs will also influence public support.
Experiments based on the Sacred Value Protection Model in Tetlock et al. (2000) found moral out-
rage at the concept of trade-offs between human life and money. The response indicated money
was unacceptable to exchange for life and as such human costs should produce lower support for
an action.
Hypothesis 3: Combat operations will generate less support than noncombat operations.
The avoidance of war is a normative, ought to be, preference founded in multiple moral tradi-
tions of western society according to Johnson (2017).
Hypothesis 4: Elements reflective of normative philosophical operational code beliefs and prag-
matic instrumental operational code beliefs will have influence on public support beyond the effects
of the situational factors.1,2
Hypothesis 5: In a combined model, operational code beliefs will alter the influence of the situ-
ation factors, but situation factors related to values will retain direct influence while factors related
to pragmatic elements will not.3
1The section on Parsing Operational Code Beliefs in this chapter will address which variables relate to instrumental
operational code beliefs and which relate to philosophical operational code beliefs.
2The specific weighting characteristics resulting from the factor analysis process will determine the variable’s
influence directionality.
3Theoretical expectations will continue to define directionality for the situation factors retaining influence.
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2.4 Data Generation
2.4.1 Participants
MTurk4 provided 1,192 unique completed survey responses. The following analysis included all
survey responses, including low quality responses.5 Participant demographics differed from those
of the U.S. population. Survey participants included more women and were slightly younger than
the broader population. They were also more educated with a large majority holding a Bachelor’s
or advanced degree. Finally, the participants identified themselves as an Independent or Democrat
at a higher rate and a Republican at a lower rate than the population.
Table 2.1: Participant and U.S. Population Demographics
Characteristic Participant Population
Median Age 31-35 range 37.9 years
Percent Female 54.2% 50.8%
Median Income $50-62k range 57,617
Bachelor’s or Advanced Degree 65% 30%
Democrat/Indep/Republican 33/54/13% 27/42/28%
All population data except political affiliation are from the
U.S. Census Bureau for 2016.
Political affiliation data are from Gallup poll responses con-
temporaneous with the researcher’s survey.
4See the discussion of MTurk in the Research Plan.
5Examples of low quality responses included 43 participants who took less than three minutes to complete the entire
survey process, 77 who took less than 10 seconds to read the approximately 220 word scenario, and a small number
who produced responses without variance in their values, for example every response was a "1". Significant overlap
between the groups existed. As an example, 29 of the 77 respondents who took less than 10 seconds to read also
completed the entire process in less than three minutes. Each scenario had similar numbers of low quality responses.
Retaining these responses in the analysis increased the error associated with the results and thus strengthened the
evidence for any significant findings.
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2.4.2 Experimental Factors
2.4.2.1 Situation
Each treatment began by introducing the participant to a situation wherein one country attacked
and occupied a neighboring country. The occupied country then asked the United States for help
with the situation. The treatments varied the type of response, the expected level of success of the
response, and the primary type of costs for the response.
2.4.2.2 ActionType
The experiment varied the type of response to the crisis. Participants received a treatment
indicating a combat response or a noncombat response:
1. Country A asked for help with the situation. In response, the United States approved in-
creased sales of military equipment at reduced cost, the transfer of excess defense equip-
ment, and the deployment of a large number of personnel in a non-combat role to improve
the training and capabilities of Country A’s military.
2. Country A asked for help with the situation. In response, the United States military deployed
a large and capable combat force to the area. In cooperation with Country A, the U.S. mili-
tary will conduct combat operations using any force necessary to drive Country B from the
territory it occupied.
2.4.2.3 SuccessLevel
To manipulate the level of success, the treatments included one of two statements:
1. Despite the combined efforts of the United States and Country A to force Country B from
the territory it took, the probability they will be able to achieve their objectives is low, esti-
mated to be 10%. Country B is likely to remain in control of the territory it invaded for the
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foreseeable future.
2. With the combined efforts of the United States and Country A aimed at forcing Country B
from the territory it took, the probability they will be able to achieve their objectives is high,
estimated to be 90%. The resulting strategic situation will restore the previous border while
reducing Country B’s ability to threaten its neighbor for the foreseeable future.
2.4.2.4 CostType
Finally, to experimentally introduce costs, the research contrasted human costs, casualties,
against financial costs. The text the participants read gave one of two situations about the costs of
the operations:
1. Experts assess the nature of fighting and environment will result in few casualties during
any effort to retake the captured territory. Specifically, few, if any, American casualties will
occur. In effect, there will be no human cost (casualties) to the United States’ actions beyond
those expected had the personnel remained at their home stations to train. The financial cost
of the operation, however, will be significantly higher than leaving the forces at home. The
vast majority of the costs to the United States will be financial costs rather than human costs
(casualties).
2. Strong support from international organizations will result in full payment for U.S. military
participation, equipment, etc. used in the crisis response. In effect, the financial cost to
the United States will be no different than leaving the forces at home to train. The human
cost in casualties, however, is expected to be significantly higher than leaving the American
personnel at home. The vast majority of the costs to the United States will be human costs
(casualties) rather than financial ones.
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2.4.3 Parsing Operational Code Beliefs
In addition to the experimental factors, the survey asked several additional questions. The ques-
tions explored the participant’s personal belief set. Some of the questions addressed the overall
benefit to the United States as well as the specific short- and long-term difference the action will
make. Other questions addressed the importance of human costs, the morality of acting, what the
participant felt for the country of interest, the participant’s political worldview, and demographics.
A principal component factor analysis on several of these variables generated three identifiable
latent concepts. The rotated factor weights are in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2: Factor Analysis Rotated Weights
Variable Instrumental Philosophical Worldview
Benefit to the U.S. 0.6747 -0.2744 0.2582
Difference the mission makes in the short run 0.8651 0.0394 0.0481
Difference the mission makes in the long run 0.8532 0.1429 0.1640
Human costs -0.0937 0.6999 -0.1609
Morality of taking action 0.2064 0.7494 0.2364
How participant felt for the foreign country -0.0183 0.7873 0.1367
Isolationist perspective -0.0770 -0.0380 -0.8894
Internationalist perspective 0.2008 0.1205 0.8483
Eigen Value 2.02943 1.78445 1.70700
The personal belief set variables separated into factors corresponding to operational code be-
liefs and political ideology. Instrumental weighted questions related to instrumental operational
code beliefs. The first variable, benefit was the response to the question, ""How much benefit
does the United States get from participating in this mission?" A score of zero indicated "None"
and a score of 10 indicated "A great Deal." The msnsrt variable was the score the participant gave
in response to the question "How much of a difference do you expect this mission to make in the
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short run?" Similarly, the msnlng variable was the response to "How much of a difference do you
expect this mission to make in the long run?" Each of these questions explored how the participant
considered the effectiveness of the action. They reflected instrumental operational code beliefs,
those focused on the mechanics of a process. Table 2.3 shows the heavily weighted questions by
operational code belief.
The second factor, Philosophical, weighted variables related to values. Each of these variables
reflected questions addressing what the participant believed ought to be when comparing the situ-
ation to an ideal. Mrl was a measure of the level of moral concern the participant had about the
situation. The sum of the responses to two questions formed the measure. The first question, "The
actions of Country B (the attacker) are. . . " provided information about the participant’s perspective
on the morality of the attack. A score of zero indicated "Morally Right" and a score of 10 indicated
"Morally Wrong." The second question, "Helping Country A (the country that was attacked in the
situation) would be. . . " provided information about the participant’s perspective on assistance. A
score of zero indicated "Highly Immoral" and a score of 10 indicated "Highly Moral." The sum re-
flected the combination of aversion to the attacker’s action and sanction of action in response. The
anyhum variable addressed the concept of human costs, not the specific costs of the mission under
assessment. The participant responded to "When considering the costs of any military action, how
important are human costs (casualties)?" with a score ranging from zero indicating "Not At All"
to 10 indicating "A Very Important Cost." Finally, feelb4 recorded the response to the question,
"Considering the situation, how would you feel toward Country A (the country that was attacked)
before any American involvement?" A response of "Happy for Them" was a zero score and "Bad
for Them" was a 10 on the scale. The normative nature of the cluster reflected philosophical oper-
ational code beliefs.
The third factor addressed the political perspective of the participant. The variables isol and
intnat provided measures of the participant’s political ideological worldview. The respective ques-
29
Table 2.3: Operational Code Belief by Heavily Weighted Questions
Factor Result Survey Questions Related Questions from George (1969)
Instrumental How much benefit does the United States How are goals pursued most effectively?
get from participating in this mission?
How much of a difference do you expect this What is the utility and role of different
mission to make in the short run? means?
How much of a difference do you expect this What is the utility and role of different
mission to make in the short run? means?
Philosophical The actions of Country B (the attacker) are. . . What is the essential nature of political
(Morally Right. . . Morally Wrong) life?
Helping Country A (the country that was How much control of historical
attacked in the situation) would be. . . development does an individual have?
(Highly Immoral. . . Highly Moral)
When considering the costs of any military What is the essential nature of political
action, how important are life?
human costs (casualties)?
Considering the situation, how would you feel How much control of historical
toward Country A (the country that was development does an individual have?
attacked) before any American involvement?
Political The United States should focus on itself
Ideology and reduce its involvement with other
countries.
The United States has a responsibility to
shape the international environment
and to engage with other countries.
tions were: "The United States should focus on itself and reduce its involvement with other coun-
tries." and "The United States has a responsibility to shape the international environment and to
engage with other countries." For each, a score of zero indicated "Completely Disagree" while a
score of 10 indicated "Completely Agree."
2.5 Modeling the Relationship Between the Situation and a Personal Belief Set
Exploring the relationship between the situation and a personal belief set required the use of
several models. The first model addressed the direct influence of situation factors on public sup-
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port.
Support =β1ActionType+ β2CostType+ β3SuccessLevel + β4SuccessLevel × CostType
+ β5SuccessLevel × ActionType+ β6ActionType× CostType
+ β7SuccessLevel × CostType× ActionType+ β8Constant+ 
The Situation model assessed whether the experimental factors or any of their interactions influ-
enced the level of support for the response to the crisis in the scenario. Each variable was categor-
ical as the section on the experimental factors discussed.
The Personal Belief Set model assessed whether the operational code belief and ideological
worldview variables had direct influence on public support. It also included a measure of per-
sonal politics. Polspec measured where on a spectrum from "Staunchly Liberal" to "Staunchly
Conservative" a participant reported him or her self6, 7.
Support =β1Instrumental + β2Philosophical + β3Worldview+
+ β4Polspec+ β5Constant+ 
Finally, the Full model combined the Situation and Personal Belief Set models.
Support =β1ActionType+ β2CostType+ β3SuccessLevel + β4Instrumental
+ β5Philosophical + β6Worldview + β7Polspec+ β8SuccessLevel × CostType
+ β9SuccessLevel × ActionType+ β10ActionType× CostType
+ β11SuccessLevel × CostType× ActionType+ β12Constant+ 
This model allowed an exploration of how the Personal Belief Set variables altered the influence
of the situation factors.
6Demographic variables including sex, age, income, education, and military participation were not significant.
7An attempt to include Polspec in the factor analysis resulted in it loading on its own factor. It did not load onto
Wordlview.
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2.6 Results
The purpose of the experiment was to determine if the situation factors influenced the support
for the response to the crisis. Figure 2.2 presents the mean, standard deviation, and number of
participants for each scenario and Figure 2.3 presents the same information by experiment factor.
Type III ANOVA analysis was appropriate for examining the Situation model. Type III ANOVA
calculates the sum of squares for each factor given the levels of other factors and all interactions.
It is appropriate when the data are unbalanced or when an interaction is significant. Both con-
ditions apply in the Situation model. All of the analyses used Helmert contrasts for the factor
variables. Helmert contrasts are appropriate to create orthogonal factors from unbalanced data.
Consequently, the Helmert contrast was proper for the analyses. Table 2.4 shows the results of the
ANOVA on the Situation model indicate all three factors influenced the support decision as did
the interaction of SuccessLevel and ActionType. Figure 2.4 depicts the effects of the factors on
Support graphically.
Figure 2.2: Support Scores by Scenario
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Figure 2.3: Support Scores by Factor and Level
Table 2.4: Experiment 1 ANOVA
Dependent variable:
Support
Sum Sq Df F value Pr(>F)
ActionType 26 1 3.1289 0.0771725∗
SuccessLevel 556 1 65.7843 1.247e− 15∗∗∗
CostType 128 1 15.1762 0.0001034∗∗∗
ActionType× SuccessLevel 73 1 8.5966 0.0034326∗∗∗
ActionType× CostType 3 1 0.3668 0.5448511
SuccessLevel × CostType 0 1 0.0291 0.8644716
ActionTypes× CostType× SuccessLevel 17 1 1.9899 0.1586099
(Intercept) 43745 1 5178.3786 < 2.2e− 16∗∗∗
Residuals 10002 1184
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Figure 2.4: Effects of Situation Factors on Support
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The ANOVA results indicated the situation factors were influential, but regression analysis can
provide further insight into the influence of the factors and of the other model elements the survey
captured. The results of regression analysis on all three models are in Table 2.5.
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Table 2.5: Experiment 1 Model Regression Results
Dependent variable:
Support
Situation Personal Belief Set Full
ActionType −0.149∗ −0.121∗∗
(0.084) (0.058)
SuccessLevel 0.683∗∗∗ −0.048
(0.084) (0.067)
CostType −0.328∗∗∗ −0.304∗∗∗
(0.084) (0.058)
Instrumental 1.703∗∗∗ 1.712∗∗∗
(0.059) (0.067)
Philosophical 0.126∗∗ 0.137∗∗
(0.059) (0.058)
Worldview 1.378∗∗∗ 1.372∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.059)
Polspec 0.142∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.022)
ActionType× SuccessLevel 0.247∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗
(0.084) (0.058)
ActionType× CostType 0.051 −0.051
(0.084) (0.058)
SuccessLevel × CostType −0.014 0.002
(0.084) (0.058)
ActionType× SuccessLevel 0.119 0.044
×CostType (0.084) (0.058)
Constant 6.060∗∗∗ 5.323∗∗∗ 5.307∗∗∗
(0.084) (0.127) (0.126)
Observations 1,192 1,192 1,192
R2 0.074 0.546 0.560
Adjusted R2 0.069 0.544 0.556
Residual Std. Error 2.906 (df = 1184) 2.034 (df = 1187) 2.007 (df = 1180)
F Statistic 13.541∗∗∗ (df = 7; 1184) 356.323∗∗∗ (df = 4; 1187) 136.437∗∗∗ (df = 11; 1180)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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2.7 Analysis of Results
The ANOVA and regression analysis on the Situation model provided strong evidence for Hy-
pothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2. Higher success levels increased public support for actions while
human costs decreased support as compared to financial costs.8 The main effect of the contrast be-
tween a noncombat response and a combat response did not achieve significance at the traditional
p = 0.05 level. The interaction of a combat response with the level of success factor was signif-
icant. Figure 2.4 depicts success was more important to public support during combat operations
than during noncombat operations.
The low R2 of the Situation model was expected. The intent of analysis of experimental factors
was to confirm they had influence through either main effects or interaction effects. Significant
ANOVA results or regression coefficients provided this confirmation. Experimental manipulation
allowed specific attribution of causality, model total explanatory power was not the intent. Despite
the lack of total explanatory power, the regression analysis provided insight into the magnitude of
change caused by each experimental factor. Figure 2.5 shows the regression coefficients. Those
coefficients were the direct influence of the experiment factors on public support. Comparing those
coefficients to the coefficients in the full model allowed assessment of Hypothesis 5.
8Removing the interactions from the model had no relevant influence on the main effects of any experiment factor
in any model.
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Figure 2.5: Situation Model Coefficients with 95% Confidence Intervals
The results on the Personal Belief Set model provided strong evidence for Hypothesis 4. Each
of the variables showed direct influence on public support. Figure 2.6 provides the coefficients.
The pragmatic element associated with instrumental operational code beliefs was more influential
than the normative philosophical operational code belief-related variable. This result was consis-
tent with the expectations of the Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler (2009) framework. The political and
ideological worldview variable and the position on a political spectrum also had influence.
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Figure 2.6: Personal Belief Set Model Coefficients with 95% Confidence Intervals
The factor analysis weighting scheme from Table 2.2 for each factor variable provided suffi-
cient guidance to usefully interpret them. Participants who considered the action in the scenario
beneficial to the United States or as making a difference in the short-term, long-term, or both lent
more support to the response. The significance and directionality of the normative, philosophical
operational code belief-related, variable indicated lower human costs, stronger moral justification
and feeling worse for the country of interest increased public support for the response in the sce-
nario. Less isolationist or increased internationalist perspective on political ideology increased
public support for the response. Finally, the political position interpretation was simple. As the
participant became more politically conservative, support for the response increased.
The Full model provided the ability to assess how the inclusion of the Personal Belief Set
model variables altered the influence of the experimental factors from the baselines set in the
Situation model. Three key aspects of the Full model results required explanation: absence of
significance for the level of success experiment factor, the emergence of the significance of the
response policy choice, and the character of the experiment factors retaining influence despite the
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inclusion of related operational code belief and worldview elements in the model. Figure 2.7 shows
the contingent influence of the factors.9
Figure 2.7: Full Model Coefficients with 95% Confidence Intervals
The coefficient on the success factor dropped from 0.68308 significant at the p = 0.001 level
to a magnitude of -0.047986 and insignificant in the model. This result was consistent with the
significant influence of Instrumental, the variable associated with the instrumental operational
code beliefs. The combination indicated the high or low level of success did not have independent
influence on public support once a measure incorporating benefits, including making a short- and
ling-term difference, was part of the model. The lack of independent influence after incorporating
operational code belief variables was consistent with Hypothesis 5’s expectation only normative
situation variables would remain significant.
9Removing the interactions from the model has negligible effects on the coefficients in the model. They remain in
the model for consistency.
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The second key aspect of the Full model was the significance of the policy choice variable.
Once the model included instrumental and philosophical operational code beliefs, a clear policy
preference against combat emerged as a main effect. While the combination of combat and high
success continued to be significant, the combination of main effects for the situation factors and
the interaction produced results indistinguishable from zero. The interaction added to public sup-
port, but each constituent element reduced public support. This result was also consistent with the
expectations of Hypothesis 5.
The last situation variable dealt with the contrast of human and financial costs. The CostType
situation variable remained significant in the Full model. This result persisted from the Situation
model with similar coefficients. The coefficient for the Situation model was -0.32809 and the co-
efficient for the Full model was -0.304174. Human costs had negative influence on public support
despite the inclusion of the value of human costs in the philosophical operational code variable,
Philosophical.
2.7.1 Mediation Analysis
One challenge of this research was assessing the directionality of the relationship between the
situation and the personal beliefs. It is possible the beliefs shaped the interpretation of the situa-
tion. It is also possible the situation activated beliefs associated with it. This reality was why the
arrow between them in the conceptual model was dual headed. For this experiment, the partici-
pants viewed the situation before being asked values-related questions. The arrow traveled from
the situation to the belief set. Mediation analysis was necessary to determine how much effect on
the influence of the situation factors the beliefs variables had.
The analysis required two steps as Imai, Keele and Yamamoto (2010) described. The first
step was to determine if any of the situation factors predicted the values of the belief variables.
Accomplishing this step required performing a regression using the belief variable as the dependent
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variable and the Full model, excluding the belief variable of interest, as the explanatory model. The
following equation was for the instrumental operational code belief variable10:
Instrumental =β1ActionType+ β2CostType+ β3SuccessLevel + β4Philosophical
+ β5Worldview + β6Polspec+ β7SuccessLevel × CostType
+ β8SuccessLevel × ActionType+ β9ActionType× CostType
+ β10SuccessLevel × CostType× ActionType+ β11Constant+ 
(2.1)
The results in Table 2.6 indicated SuccessLevel predicted Instrumental requiring continu-
ation onto the second step, determining the Average Causal Mediation Effect (ACME) using the
methods in Tingley et al. (2014).
10None of the experimental factors predicted the philosophical operational code belief variable. No further media-
tion analysis using it was necessary
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Table 2.6: Mediation Step 1
Dependent variable:
Instrumental
ActionType −0.016
(0.025)
SuccessLevel 0.491∗∗∗
(0.025)
CostTyoe −0.026
(0.025)
Philosophical 0.007
(0.025)
WorldV iew 0.049∗
(0.026)
Polspec 0.045∗∗∗
(0.009)
ActionType× SuccessLevel 0.050∗∗
(0.025)
ActionType× CostType 0.017
(0.025)
SuccessLevel × CostType 0.007
(0.025)
ActionType× SuccessLevel × CostType 0.020
(0.025)
Constant −0.231∗∗∗
(0.054)
Observations 1,192
R2 0.256
Adjusted R2 0.249
Residual Std. Error 0.866 (df = 1181)
F Statistic 40.586∗∗∗ (df = 10; 1181)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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The mediation calculations leveraged 1000 simulations to estimate the ACME using a boot-
strapping technique. The results in Table 2.7 show the ACME, Total Effect, and Proportion Me-
diated were significant, but the experiment factor direct effect was not. These results indicate
Instrumental fully mitigated SuccessLevel. The experimental manipulation of the level of suc-
cess no longer had direct influence after taking beliefs about the ends-means relationship into
account.
Table 2.7: Mediation Calculation
Estimate 95% Confidence Interval p− value
Ave. Causal Mediation Effect 1.6813 1.4514-1.91 <2e-16∗∗∗
Ave. Direct Effect −0.0972 -0.3867-0.18 0.49
Total Effect 1.5842 1.3146-1.86 <2e-16∗∗∗
Proportion Mediated 1.0613 0.8985-1.27 <2e-16∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
2.8 Experiment 1 Conclusion
Experiment 1 provided several insights. First, the public prefers noncombat over combat when
its preference process includes instrumental and philosophical operational code beliefs (Hypoth-
esis 3). Second, differences in the situation of an international crisis matter to generating public
support. The public will provide greater support for operations it expects to be successful (Hypoth-
esis 1) and less support for those incurring human costs over financial costs (Hypothesis 2).
Experiment 1 also demonstrated both the value of operational code beliefs for influencing public
support (Hypothesis 4) and what situation factors retain influence despite the inclusion of opera-
tional code beliefs in modeling. The factors retaining influence related to important values; combat
is undesirable and human life is valuable (Hypothesis 5).
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Finally, the factors important to determining public support for noncombat were essentially the
same as for combat in this experiment. The participants preferred noncombat when incorporating
operational code beliefs in preference formation, but the other elements driving the level of support
were essentially the same for both policies.
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3. THE INFLUENCE OF VALUES AND RELATIONSHIPS
3.1 Experiment on Value-Based Factors
The second experiment explored how value-based factors of a situation influenced the public
support of a U.S. military operation. Exploration of research into public support for foreign pol-
icy, particularly foreign aid and conflict, indicated three trends occur in both. This experiment
addressed two of the trends. One trend this experiment addressed was the character of the actors
involved. Chong and Gradstein (2008) and Paxton and Knack (2012) found individual character-
istics of both the recipient and the donor influenced public support for foreign aid. For example,
if donors believed the recipients were responsible for being in need of aid, donor public support
for it decreased. When considering conflict, Russett and Nincic (1976) identified how the identity
of the country in need influenced support for a military defense of the country. Hetherington and
Suhay (2011) and Kane and Norpoth (2017) found individual characteristics of the member of the
public also altered support for conflict.
The second trend this experiment explored was moral. In foreign aid research, recognition of
genuine need, a spirit of generosity, and a commitment to altruism each increased public support
(Mosley (1985); Otter (2003); Fink and Redaelli (2011); Paxton and Knack (2012)). In conflict
research, the justification for action and policy objective pursued influenced public support. Ac-
tion the public saw as justified or a policy objective to intercede on humanitarian grounds or to
restrain an other’s aggressive foreign policy found increased public support (Gelpi, Feaver and
Reifler (2009); Jentleson and Britton (1998); Oneal, Lian and Joyner (1996); Eichenberg (2005);
Jentleson (1992)).
It is possible the trends exist because of the influence of a personal belief set of an individual.
Tetlock (1986) argued individuals bring values to bear when forming preferences. Those could be
46
based on philosophical and instrumental operational code beliefs leading to normative and prag-
matic influences beyond the specifics of the situation. If so, they would have influence on public
support separately from the factors of the situation and could alter the influence of situation factors.
3.2 Experimental Design
This research used the second experiment to explore the influence of situation factors related
to values on the levels of support combat and noncombat responses to an international crisis. The
research used a 2x2x2 between-groups factorial experimental design to manipulate the type of cri-
sis response, the relationship between the United States and the country of interest, and the level
of sympathy for the country of interest. Each participant received one of eight treatments after
random assignment to it.
Figure 3.1: Influence of the Values-Based Factors on Support
3.3 Experiment Hypotheses
Each of the experimental factors related to values, however different theoretical justifications
provided the hypotheses foundations.
Hypothesis 1: Friendly relations between the United States and the supported country will in-
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crease the level of support.
Research by Mercer (1995), Geva and Hanson (1999), and Lyall (2010) found affinity via belong-
ing to a common in-group or cultural similarity led to different behaviors when interacting with
those in the group as compared to those outside it. The behaviors generally benefited or protected
the in-group participant and as a result, being part of the in group could influence public support
for actions deemed beneficial to another in the in group.
Hypothesis 2: High levels of sympathy for the country receiving assistance will produce a
higher level of support than low levels of sympathy.
Eisenberg (2000) argued sympathy is related to morality and is other-centric and, according to
Batson and Powell (2003), led to more pro-social responses.
Hypothesis 3: Combat operations will generate less support than noncombat operations.
The avoidance of war is a normative preference founded on multiple western moral traditions ac-
cording to Johnson (2017). This hypothesis also is consistent with the findings on the Full model
of the first experiment.
Hypothesis 4: Elements reflective of normative philosophical operational code beliefs and prag-
matic instrumental operational code beliefs will have influence on public support.1,2
Hypothesis 5: In a combined model, operational code beliefs will alter the influence of the
situation factors, but situation factors normatively treated as infinitely valuable will retain direct
influence while factors related to instrumental elements will not.3 Tetlock et al. (2000) used the
value of one’s children or friendships as examples of such infinitely valuable factors.
1The section on Parsing Operational Code Beliefs in this chapter will address which variables relate to instrumental
operational code beliefs and which relate to philosophical operational code beliefs.
2The specific weighting characteristics resulting from the factor analysis process will determine the variable’s
influence directionality.
3Theoretical expectations will continue to define directionality for the situation factors retaining influence.
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3.4 Data Generation
3.4.1 Participants
MTurk4 provided 1,215 unique completed survey responses. The following analysis included
all survey responses, including low quality responses.5 Participant demographics differed from
those of the U.S. population. Survey participants were slightly younger than the broader popula-
tion. They were also more educated with a large majority holding a Bachelor’s or advanced degree.
Finally, the participants identified themselves as an Independent or Democrat at a higher rate and
a Republican at a lower rate than the population.
Table 3.1: Participant and U.S. Population Demographics
Characteristic Participant Population
Median Age 31-35 range 37.9 years
Percent Female 50.4% 50.8%
Median Income $50-62k range 57,617
Bachelor’s or Advanced Degree 62% 30%
Democrat/Indep/Republican 31/54/15% 27/42/28%
All population data except political affiliation are from the
U.S. Census Bureau for 2016
Political affiliation data are from Gallup poll responses con-
temporaneous with the researcher’s survey.
4See the discussion of MTurk in the Research Plan.
5Examples of low quality responses included 47 participants who took less than three minutes to complete the entire
survey process, 99 who took less than 10 seconds to read the approximately 150 word scenario, and a small number
who produced responses without variance in their values, for example every response was a "1". Significant overlap
between the groups existed. As an example, 38 of the 99 respondents who took less than 10 seconds to read also
completed the entire process in less than three minutes. Each scenario had similar numbers of low quality responses.
Retaining these responses in the analysis increased the error associated with the results and thus strengthened the
evidence for any significant findings.
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3.4.2 Experimental Factors
3.4.2.1 Situation
Each treatment presented the participant with a situation wherein one country attacked and oc-
cupied a neighboring country. The occupied country then asked the United States for help with the
situation. The treatments varied the type of response, the relationship between the United States
and the country of interest, and how sympathetic a victim the country of interest was.
3.4.2.2 Friend
To vary the level of the relationship between the United States and the country of interest in the
scenario, the treatments included one of two statements:
1. The United States and Country A have a challenging relationship. The populations see little
common in their cultures and values. At the same time, Country A and the United States have
few common economic and political interests and rarely cooperate on international matters.
2. The United States has friendly relations with Country A. The populations share culture and
values. The United States and Country A have common economic and political interests
resulting in regular cooperation in international matters.
3.4.2.3 Sympathy
To experimentally manipulate sympathy, the research contrasted scenarios with different levels
of victimization of the country of interest. The text the participants read gave one of two situations:
1. Country A and Country B have been long-term rivals due to a disagreement about the cor-
rect placement of their shared border. Following a series of escalating provocations includ-
ing strong words from political leaders and small but tense military standoffs, Country B
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attacked and took control of the portion of the disputed area in Country A.
2. A natural disaster recently struck Country A resulting in large numbers of casualties and
wide-spread damage to its infrastructure and governing capabilities. Country B, its neigh-
bor, used the situation as an opportunity to invade Country A based on claims Country A
stole lands from Country B. This is an absolute lie and Country B is known as an interna-
tional bully and bad actor. The attack came without warning and resulted in large numbers
of civilian and military casualties in Country A.
3.4.2.4 ActionType
Finally, the experiment varied the type of response to the crisis. Participants received a treatment
indicating a combat response or a noncombat response:
1. Country A asked for help with the situation. In response, the United States approved in-
creased sales of military equipment at reduced cost, the transfer of excess defense equip-
ment, and the deployment of a large number of personnel in a non-combat role to improve
the training and capabilities of Country A’s military.
2. Country A asked for help with the situation. In response, the United States military deployed
a large and capable combat force to the area. In cooperation with Country A, the U.S. mili-
tary will conduct combat operations using any force necessary to drive Country B from the
territory it occupied.
3.4.3 Parsing Operational Code Beliefs
In addition to the experimental factors, the survey asked several additional questions. The ques-
tions explored the participant’s personal belief set. Some of the questions addressed how justified
51
in acting the United States was, the expected success level of the response, the overall benefit to the
United States as well as the specific short- and long-term difference the action will make. Other
questions addressed the importance of human costs, the morality of acting, what the participant
felt for the country of interest, the participant’s political worldview, and demographics.
A principal component factor analysis on several of these variables generated three identifiable
latent concepts. The rotated factor weights are in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Factor Analysis Rotated Weights
Variable Instrumental Worldview Philosophical
How justified in taking action the U.S. was 0.6181 0.4270 0.3294
Benefit to the U.S. 0.5406 0.2372 -0.1968
Expected level of success for the mission 0.7941 0.0952 -0.0446
Difference the mission makes in the short run 0.7611 0.1431 0.1464
Difference the mission makes in the long run 0.7656 0.1749 0.1948
Human costs -0.1213 -0.1119 0.7299
Morality of taking action 0.3915 0.2295 0.6971
How participant felt for the foreign country 0.1206 0.1406 0.7420
Isolationist perspective -0.0690 -0.8874 -0.0262
Internationalist perspective 0.2825 0.7893 0.1137
Eigen Value 2.73738 1.79413 1.79136
The personal belief set variables separated into factors corresponding to operational code be-
liefs and political ideology. Instrumental weighted questions related to instrumental operational
code beliefs. The first variable, justify was the response to the question, "The United States ac-
tions in the situation are. . . " A score of zero indicated "Totally Unjustified" while a 10 indicated
"Completely Justified." benefit was the response to the question, ""How much benefit does the
United States get from participating in this mission?" A score of zero indicated "None" and a score
of 10 indicated "A great Deal." The scenarios did not provide any information on the level of
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success the action may have. The variable expsucc captured information on success through the
question, "What do you think the chances are the operation will successfully return the situation to
the conditions before the attack?" The respondent provided a response in 10% increments between
zero and 100%. Themsnsrt variable was the score the participant gave in response to the question
"How much of a difference do you expect this mission to make in the short run?" Similarly, the
msnlng variable was the response to "How much of a difference do you expect this mission to
make in the long run?" Each of these questions explored how the participant considered the effec-
tiveness of the action. They reflected instrumental operational code beliefs, those focused on the
mechanics of a process. Table 3.3 shows the heavily weighted questions by operational code belief.
The second factor addressed the political perspective of the participant. The variables isol
and intnat provided measures of the participant’s political ideological worldview. The respective
questions were: "The United States should focus on itself and reduce its involvement with other
countries." and "The United States has a responsibility to shape the international environment and
to engage with other countries." For each, a score of zero indicated "Completely Disagree" while
a score of 10 indicated "Completely Agree."
Finally, the third factor, Philosophical, weighted variables related to values. Each of these
variables reflected questions addressing what the participant believed ought to be when comparing
the situation to an ideal. Mrl was a measure of the level of moral concern the participant had about
the situation. The sum of the responses to two questions formed the measure. The first question,
"The actions of Country B (the attacker) are. . . " provided information about the participant’s per-
spective on the morality of the attack. A score of zero indicated "Morally Right" and a score of
10 indicated "Morally Wrong." The second question, "Helping Country A (the country that was
attacked in the situation) would be. . . " provided information about the participant’s perspective
on assistance. A score of zero indicated "Highly Immoral" and a score of 10 indicated "Highly
Moral." The sum reflected the combination of aversion to the attacker’s action and sanction of
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action in response. The anyhum variable addressed the concept of human costs, not the specific
costs of the mission under assessment. The participant responded to "When considering the costs
of any military action, how important are human costs (casualties)?" with a score ranging from
zero indicating "Not At All" to 10 indicating "A Very Important Cost." Finally, feelb4 recorded
the response to the question, "Considering the situation, how would you feel toward Country A (the
country that was attacked) before any American involvement?" A response of "Happy for Them"
was a zero score and "Bad for Them" was a 10 on the scale. The normative nature of the cluster
reflected philosophical operational code beliefs.
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Table 3.3: Operational Code Belief by Heavily Weighted Questions
Factor Result Survey Questions Related Questions from
George (1969)
Instrumental The United States actions in the How are goals pursued most
situation are. . . effectively?
(Totally Unjustified. . . Completely Justified)
How much benefit does the United States get What is the utility and role of
from participating in this mission? different means?
What do you think the chances are the How are goals pursued most
operation will successfully return the situation effectively?
to the conditions before the attack?
How much of a difference do you expect this What is the utility and role of
mission to make in the short run? different means?
How much of a difference do you expect this What is the utility and role of
mission to make in the short run? different means?
Philosophical The actions of Country B (the attacker) are. . . What is the essential nature of
(Morally Right. . . Morally Wrong) political life?
Helping Country A (the country that was How much control of historical
attacked in the situation) would be. . . development does an individual
(Highly Immoral. . . Highly Moral) have?
When considering the costs of any military What is the essential nature of
action, how important are human political life?
costs (casualties)?
Considering the situation, how would you feel How much control of historical
toward Country A (the country that was development does an individual
attacked) before any American involvement? have?
Political Ideology The United States should focus on itself
Ideology and reduce its involvement with other
countries.
The United States has a responsibility to
shape the international environment
and to engage with other countries.
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3.5 Modeling the Relationship Between the Situation and a Personal Belief Set
Exploring the relationship between the situation and a personal belief set required the use of
several models. The first model addressed the direct influence of situation factors on public sup-
port.
Support =β1ActionType+ β2Friend+ β3Sympathy + β4ActionType× Friend
+ β5ActionType× Sympathy + β6Friend× Sympathy
+ β7ActionType× Friend× Sympathy + β8Constant+ 
The Situation model assessed whether the experimental factors or any of their interactions influ-
enced the level of support for the response to the crisis in the scenario. Each variable was categor-
ical as the section on the experimental factors discussed.
The Personal Belief Set model assessed whether the operational code belief and ideological
worldview variables had direct influence on public support. It also included a measure of per-
sonal politics. Polspec measured where on a spectrum from "Staunchly Liberal" to "Staunchly
Conservative" a participant reported him or her self6, 7.
Support =β1Instrumental + β2Philosophical + β3Worldview+
+ β4Polspec+ β5Constant+ 
6Demographic variables including sex, age, income, education, and military participation were not significant.
7An attempt to include Polspec in the factor analysis resulted in it loading on its own factor. It did not load onto
Wordlview.
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Finally, the Full model combined the Situation and Personal Belief Set models.
Support =β1ActionType+ β2Friend+ β3Sympathy + β4Instrumental
+ β5Philosophical + β6Worldview + β7Polspec+ β8ActionType× Friend
+ β9ActionType× Sympathy + β10Friend× Sympathy
+ β11ActionType× Friend× Sympathy + β12Constant+ 
This model allowed an exploration of how the Personal Beliefs Set variables altered the influence
of the situation factors.
3.6 Results
The purpose of the experiment was to determine if the experiment factors influenced the support
decision. Figure 3.2 presents the mean, standard deviation, and number of participants for each
scenario and Figure 3.3 provides the same information for the experiment factors. Type III ANOVA
analysis was appropriate for examining the Situation model. Type III ANOVA calculates the sum of
squares for each factor given the levels of other factors and all interactions. It is appropriate when
the data are unbalanced or when an interaction is significant. Both conditions apply in the Situation
model. All of the analyses used Helmert contrasts for the factor variables. Helmert contrasts are
appropriate to create orthogonal factors from unbalanced data. Consequently, the Helmert contrast
was proper for the analyses. As Table 3.3 shows, the results of an ANOVA on the Situation model
indicated both the relationship between the United States and the country receiving assistance and
the level of the sympathy factor as well as the interaction between those factors were relevant to the
support level decision at a p = 0.01 significance level. The type of action, combat or noncombat,
was not significant on its own, but was part of a significant three-way interaction between the
factors. Figure 3.4 shows the effects of the factors on Support graphically.
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Figure 3.2: Support Scores by Scenario
Figure 3.3: Support Scores by Factor and Level
Table 3.4: Experiment 2 ANOVA
Dependent variable:
Support
Sum Sq Df F value Pr(>F)
ActionType 7 1 0.9047 0.341722
Friend 686 1 89.8306 < 2.2e− 16∗∗∗
Sympathy 512 1 67.0818 6.574e− 16∗∗∗
ActionType× Friend 12 1 1.5579 0.212213
ActionType× Sympathy 12 1 1.5621 0.211606
Friend× Sympathy 66 1 8.6678 0.003301∗∗∗
ActionType× Friend× Sympathy 21 1 2.7149 0.099675∗
(Intercept) 55307 1 7240.5964 < 2.2e− 16∗∗∗
Residuals 9920 1207
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Figure 3.4: Effects of Factors on Support
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The ANOVA results indicated which factors were influential, but regression analysis can
provide further insight into the influence of the factors and of the other model elements the survey
captured. The results of regression analysis on all four models are in Table 3.4.
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Table 3.5: Model Results
Dependent variable:
Support
Situation Personal Belief Set Full
ActionType −0.075 −0.202∗∗∗
(0.079) (0.053)
Friend 0.752∗∗∗ 0.224∗∗∗
(0.079) (0.055)
Sympathy 0.650∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗
(0.079) (0.055)
Instrumental 1.732∗∗∗ 1.671∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.057)
Philosophical 0.565∗∗∗ 0.527∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.054)
Worldview 1.343∗∗∗ 1.287∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.054)
Polspec 0.122∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.019)
ActionType× Friend −0.099 −0.081
(0.079) (0.053)
ActionType× Sympathy −0.099 −0.076
(0.079) (0.053)
Friend× Sympathy −0.233∗∗∗ −0.076
(0.079) (0.053)
ActionType× Friend 0.131∗ 0.080
×Sympathy (0.079) (0.053)
Constant 6.748∗∗∗ 6.094∗∗∗ 6.078∗∗∗
(0.079) (0.119) (0.118)
Observations 1,215 1,214 1,214
R2 0.125 0.602 0.617
Adjusted R2 0.120 0.601 0.614
Residual Std. Error 2.764 (df = 1207) 1.862 (df = 1209) 1.832 (df = 1202)
F Statistic 24.541∗∗∗ (df = 7; 1207) 456.879∗∗∗ (df = 4; 1209) 176.113∗∗∗ (df = 11; 1202)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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3.7 Analysis of Results
The ANOVA and regression analysis on the Situation model provided strong evidence for Hy-
pothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2. In each case, the experimental factor was significant at the p = 0.001
level.8 Consistent with theories about in-group behavior, friendly relations increased the level of
support for a response to the crisis. The scenarios designed to generate more sympathy for the
country in need of assistance also received more support. Evidence for Hypothesis 3, a preference
for noncombat, did not exist in the Situation model.
With the absence of a significant main effect in the experiment for the contrast of combat and
noncombat, it was necessary to confirm the participants understood the difference between the
combat and noncombat scenarios. Three separate manipulation checks built into the survey con-
firmed the participants understood the difference. The manipulation check questions asked if the
United States’ response to the situation was mostly combat or mostly noncombat, if the United
States deployed forces to fight war along side the other country, and if the United States deployed
forces to train and support the other country’s military. In each case, a difference of means test sig-
nificant at the p = 0.001 level indicated the participants understood the difference between combat
and noncombat scenarios. The participants understood the difference and still gave similar support
to both combat and noncombat responses to the crisis.
As the ANOVA indicated, and Figure 3.5 shows, regression analyses on the Situation model
confirmed both the significance and directionality of the influence of the Friend and Sympathy
factors as being consistent with expectations. Friendly relations and a more sympathetic scenario
increased support. Figure 3.6, a pull out of part of Figure 3.4, provides insight into the significant
interaction between Friend and Sympathy. While the interaction coefficient is negative, the
most appropriate interpretation of the result was that a sympathetic scenario motivated a larger
8Removing the interactions from the model had no relevant influence on the main effects of any experiment factor
in any model.
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increase in support for a country with a challenging relationship with the United States than the
same scenario did for a friend. The result may be the result of the effect of the friendly country
being part of the in-group. Sympathy had less capacity to increase public support support for
a friend because the public would support a friend more regardless of the scenario, as figure 3.6
demonstrates.
Figure 3.5: Situation Model Coefficients with 95% Confidence Intervals
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Figure 3.6: Relative influence of Friend and Sympathy on Public Support
The results on the Personal Belief Set model provided strong evidence for Hypothesis 4. Each
of the variables showed direct influence on public support. Figure 3.7 provides the coefficients.
The pragmatic element associated with instrumental operational code beliefs was more influential
than the normative philosophical operational code belief-related variable. This result was consis-
tent with the expectations of the Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler (2009) framework. The political and
ideological worldview variable also had influence. Polspec measured where on a spectrum from
"Staunchly Liberal" to "Staunchly Conservative" a participant reported him or her self9, 10.
9Demographic variables including sex, age, income, education, and military participation were not significant.
10An attempt to include Polspec in the factor analysis resulted in it loading on its own factor. It did not load onto
Wordlview.
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Figure 3.7: Personal Belief Set Model Coefficients with 95% Confidence Intervals
The factor analysis weighting scheme for Instrumental and Philosophical from Table 3.2
provided sufficient guidance to allow useful interpretation. Participants who considered the ac-
tion in the scenario justified, thought the action would be successful in generating benefit for the
United States or as making a difference lent more support to the response. The significance and
directionality of the normative, philosophical operational code belief-related, variable indicated
lower human costs, stronger moral justification and feeling worse for the country of interest in-
creased public support for the response in the scenario. Less isolationist or increased international-
ist perspective on political ideology increased public support for the response. Finally, the political
spectrum interpretation was simple. As the participant became more politically conservative, sup-
port for the response increased.
The Full model provided the ability to assess how the inclusion of the Personal Belief Set model
variables altered the influence of the experimental factors from the baselines set in the Situation
model. Four key aspects of the Full model results required explanation: the emergence of the
significance of the response policy choice, the reduction in the magnitude of the coefficients for
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Friend and Sympathy, and the character of the experiment factors retaining influence despite
the inclusion of related operational code belief and ideological worldview elements in the model.
Figure 3.7 shows the contingent influence of the factors.11
Figure 3.8: Full Model Coefficients with 95% Confidence Intervals
The coefficient for ActionType changed from -0.07543 to -0.20205 and became significant at
the p = 0.001 level. The significant difference in public support between a combat and a noncom-
bat response was the result of the instrumental operational code belief variable, Instrumental.
Once the model controlled for the participant’s effectiveness expectations, the moral preference
for noncombat emerged12. The preference existed despite the model controlling for normative
preferences through the Philosophical variable.
11Removing the interactions from the model has negligible effects on the coefficients in the model. They remain in
the model for consistency.
12Removing Instrumental from the model returns ActionType to insignificance.
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The reduction in the coefficient for Friend from 0.75162 to 0.22441 implied the operational
code belief and Worldview variables mitigated the influence of the relationship, but the in-group
preference remained. The same is true for Sympathy. The coefficient declined from 0.64951
to 0.15657 indicating the the egregiousness of the situation held influence beyond the moral and
practical implications.
The final aspect to explore was the character of the situation factors remaining influential. Each
of the experiment factors dealt with normative concerns. Preference for noncombat, value in
friendship, and sympathy for another are each value-based choices. They were significant in the
Full model despite the inclusion of the operational code belief variables. In fact, the inclusion of
operational code beliefs exposed the underlying moral preference for noncombat. These results
provide strong evidence for Hypothesis 5. The situational factors remaining significant after in-
cluding operational code belief variables were values based, not pragmatic.
3.7.1 Mediation Analysis
One challenge of this research was assessing the directionality of the relationship between the
situation and the personal beliefs. It is possible the beliefs shaped the interpretation of the situa-
tion. It is also possible the situation activated beliefs associated with it. This reality was why the
arrow between them in the conceptual model was dual headed. For this experiment, the partici-
pants viewed the situation before being asked values-related questions. The arrow traveled from
the situation to the belief set. Mediation analysis was necessary to determine how much effect on
the influence of the situation factors the beliefs variables had.
The analysis required two steps as Imai, Keele and Yamamoto (2010) described. The first step
was to determine if any of the situation factors predicted the values of the belief variables. Ac-
complishing this step required performing a regression using the belief variable as the dependent
variable and the Full model, excluding the belief variable of interest, as the explanatory model.
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Analyses of the following equations determined the experiment factors predicted the beliefs. Con-
sequently, assessment of the direct and causal mediation effects was necessary.
Instrumental =β1ActionType+ β2Friend+ β3Sympathy + β4Philosophical
+ β5Worldview + β6Polspec+ β7ActionType× Friend
+ β8ActionType× Sympathy + β9Friend× Sympathy
+ β10ActionType× Friend× Sympathy + β11Constant+ 
(3.1)
Philosophical =β1ActionType+ β2Friend+ β3Sympathy + β4Instrumental
+ β5Worldview + β6Polspec+ β7ActionType× Friend
+ β8ActionType× Sympathy + β9Friend× Sympathy
+ β10ActionType× Friend× Sympathy + β11Constant+ 
(3.2)
The results in Table 3.6 indicated all three experiment factors predicted Instrumrntal and
Sympathy predicted Philosophical. These results required continuation onto the second step,
determining the Average Causal Mediation Effect (ACME) using the methods in Tingley et al.
(2014)13.
13One observation did not include sufficient data for inclusion in the mediation analysis.
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Table 3.6: Mediation Step 1
Dependent variable:
Instrumental Philosophical
(1) (2)
ActionType 0.132∗∗∗ −0.034
(0.027) (0.028)
Friend 0.263∗∗∗ 0.0001
(0.027) (0.029)
Sympathy 0.157∗∗∗ 0.221∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.029)
Philosophical −0.021
(0.028)
Instrumental −0.023
(0.030)
WorldV iew −0.0003 −0.027
(0.028) (0.029)
Polspec 0.055∗∗∗ −0.015
(0.010) (0.010)
ActionType× Friend 0.002 0.015
(0.027) (0.028)
ActionType× Sympathy 0.006 −0.040
(0.027) (0.028)
Friend× Sympathy −0.054∗∗ 0.008
(0.027) (0.028)
ActionType× Friend× Sympathy 0.018 −0.030
(0.027) (0.028)
Constant −0.303∗∗∗ 0.080
(0.059) (0.063)
Observations 1,214 1,214
R2 0.137 0.053
Adjusted R2 0.130 0.045
Residual Std. Error (df = 1203) 0.933 0.978
F Statistic (df = 10; 1203) 19.050∗∗∗ 6.688∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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The mediation calculations leveraged 1000 simulations to estimate the ACME using a boot-
strapping technique. The results in Table 3.7 show Instrumental mediated each of the experi-
ment factors. While Friend and Sympathy maintained more than 30% of their influence on public
support as direct influence despite mediation, Instrumental fully mediated ActionType. Finding
the direct effect of ActionType significant, however, meant a preference existed when holding
Instrumental constant; the same result as in the Full model regression analysis. The examination
of the mediation effects of Philosophical showed it mediated Sympathy, but Sympathy also
maintained significant direct influence.
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Table 3.7: Mediation Calculation
Estimate 95% Confidence Interval p− value
Mediation by Instrumental
ActionType
Ave. Causal Mediation Effect 0.441 0.250-0.61 <2e-16∗∗∗
Ave. Direct Effect -0.406 -0.611-(-0.20) <2e-16∗∗∗
Total Effect 0.035 -0.243-0.32 0.8
Proportion Mediated 12.605 -45.846-51.89 0.8
Friend
Ave. Causal Mediation Effect 0.878 0.703-1.06 <2e-16∗∗∗
Ave. Direct Effect 0.448 0.227-0.66 <2e-16∗∗∗
Total Effect 1.326 1.042-1.60 <2e-16∗∗∗
Proportion Mediated 0.662 0.554-0.81 <2e-16∗∗∗
Sympathy
Ave. Causal Mediation Effect 0.525 0.325-0.73 <2e-16∗∗∗
Ave. Direct Effect 0.312 0.117-0.54 <2e-16∗∗∗
Total Effect 0.837 0.533-1.14 <2e-16∗∗∗
Proportion Mediated 0.627 0.461-0.83 <2e-16∗∗∗
Mediation by Philosophical
Sympathy
Ave. Causal Mediation Effect 0.2330 0.1557-0.32 <2e-16∗∗∗
Ave. Direct Effect 0.3123 0.0999-0.54 0.002∗∗∗
Total Effect 0.5454 0.3345-0.77 <2e-16∗∗∗
Proportion Mediated 0.4273 0.2628-0.71 <2e-16∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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3.8 Experiment 2 Conclusion
Experiment 2 provided several insights. First, the public prefers noncombat over combat when
its preference process includes instrumental and philosophical operational code beliefs (Hypoth-
esis 3). Second, differences in the situation of an international crisis matter to generating public
support. The public will provide greater support for those with whom the United States has a
friendly relationship (Hypothesis 1) and for those whose situation generates sympathy (Hypothesis
2).
Experiment 2 also demonstrated the value of operational code beliefs for influencing public
support (Hypothesis 4). Finally, it demonstrated that situation factors retain influence despite the
inclusion of operational code beliefs when they relate to important values; combat is undesirable,
friendship matters, and sympathy motivates (Hypothesis 5).
Finally, the factors important to determining public support for noncombat were essentially the
same as for combat in this experiment. The participants preferred noncombat when incorporating
operational code beliefs in preference formation, but the other elements driving the level of support
were similar for both policies.
72
4. INSIDE NONCOMBAT OPERATIONS
4.1 Experiment on the Influence of Noncombat Operation Characteristics on Public Sup-
port
The third experiment explored how different characteristics of a military noncombat operation
influenced public support for it. Studies on both foreign aid and combat operations found public
support levels depend on a complex combination of factors. Foreign aid literature indicated practi-
cal concerns had influence on the public support of aid. Factors from the strategic importance of the
aid recipient to the income of the donors influenced the types and levels of aid offered as well as the
public support for it (Milner and Tingley (2013); Fink and Redaelli (2011); Otter (2003); Paxton
and Knack (2012)). In conflict literature, one practical concern critical to the public’s support of
combat missions was cost. Some studies found the public evaluates the costs in terms of casualties
(Gartner and Segura (1998); Eichenberg (2005)). Other studies found the costs related to financial
burdens were relevant, particularly for debt funding (Flores-Macías and Kreps (2015)). It is pos-
sible the public did not undergo a complex cost analysis when determining its support (Berinsky
(2007)) or they do not differentiate between human and financial costs, although they still consider
costs generally important in determining support (?). Finally, some scholars argued costs, particu-
larly casualty costs, lose relevance when compared to the expectation of success (Gelpi, Feaver and
Reifler (2009)). Costs are therefore important practical considerations for evaluating the support
the public grants a military action.
The characteristics of the actors involved may also influence public support for military non-
combat operations. Chong and Gradstein (2008) and Paxton and Knack (2012) found attitudes
toward recipients (the other), a perception of the inefficiency of one’s own government (the pri-
mary actor), and political spectrum position (one’s self) influenced public support for foreign aid.
Such attitudes toward the recipient of assistance could manifest in support for military noncombat
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operations. It is possible the public would consider military-to-military relationships as the only
acceptable role for the U.S. military’s interaction with the recipient country. The public may view
aiding civilian elements as being outside the military’s purview. The public may deem such mis-
sions more appropriate for other governmental elements such as the Department of State or the U.S.
Agency for International Development. Concerns regarding the militarization of the relationship
the United States has with foreign civilian governments may also influence support (Krahenbuhl
et al. (2011); SCHR Position Paper on Humanitarian-Military Relations (2010)).
In foreign aid literature, one consistent influential factor is the moral justification for the aid. A
perception of aid’s need as well as feelings of altruism or generosity toward the recipient increased
public support for foreign aid (Mosley (1985); Otter (2003); Fink and Redaelli (2011); Paxton
and Knack (2012)). The morality of the purpose for military combat operations also influenced
public support. Several scholars found the "principal policy objective (PPO)" of a mission to be
one of the vital factors for determining public support for combat operations. Public support was
significantly lower when the PPO was to initiate an internal change of the foreign nation’s regime,
an act seen as aggressive, than it was for objectives related to national security concerns, such as
restraining a belligerent’s aggressive foreign policy, or for humanitarian interventions (Jentleson
(1992); Jentleson and Britton (1998); Oneal, Lian and Joyner (1996); Eichenberg (2005); Nincic
(1997)). Given this background, it is possible the moral foundation for the noncombat operation
will influence the support it receives from the public.
4.2 Experimental Design
This research used Experiment 3 to explore how situational factors influenced public support for
military noncombat operations. The research used a 2x2x2 between-groups factorial experimental
design to manipulate the purpose of the operation as a measure of morality, the characteristics of
the recipients, and the cost of the operation. Each participant received one of eight treatments after
random assignment to it.
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Figure 4.1: Influences on Support of Noncombat Operations
4.3 Experiment Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: Noncombat operations with a humanitarian purpose will garner more support
than those with a national security interest.
The logic of the Sacred Values Protection Model as Tetlock et al. (2000) described applied to
this hypothesis. Humanitarian purpose will provide the opportunity to protect what is normatively
considered infinitely valuable, lives. Such a purpose also more popular than other more aggressive
foreign policy purposes according to the PPO concept of Jentleson (1992).
Hypothesis 2: Noncombat operations providing benefit to foreign military recipients will gen-
erate more support than those providing assistance to foreign civilian recipients.
Paxton and Knack (2012) found differences in attitudes toward the recipients generated differ-
ent level of support for foreign aid. While their research focused on attitudes about perceptions
of the recipient’s ability to help themselves, the underlying idea related to perceptions about the
characteristics of the recipient having influence.
Hypothesis 3: High cost noncombat operations will generate less support than low cost opera-
tions.
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Participants should behave consistently with rational choice logic.
Hypothesis 4: Elements reflective of pragmatic instrumental operational code beliefs will have
influence on public support.1
Hypothesis 5: In a combined model, operational code beliefs will alter the influence of the sit-
uation factors, but situation factors related to important values will retain direct influence.
4.4 Data Generation
4.4.1 Participants
MTurk2 provided 814 unique completed survey responses3. The following analysis included
all survey responses, including low quality responses4. Participant demographics differed from
those of the U.S. population. Survey participants included significantly fewer women and were
slightly younger than the broader population. They also identified themselves as an Independent
or a Democrat at a higher rate and Republican at a lower rate than the population.
1The section on Parsing Operational Code Beliefs in this chapter will address which variables relate to instrumental
operational code beliefs and which relate to philosophical operational code beliefs.
2See the discussion of MTurk in the Research Plan.
3A software-related data collection problem caused Scenario 6 to have fewer responses than expected from the
random assignment process. The random assignment process functioned properly for all scenarios, but for a short
period of time respondents assigned to Scenario 6 could not complete the survey for recorded results.
4Examples of low quality responses included 123 participants who took less than three minutes to complete the
entire survey process and a small number who produced responses with very little variance in their values, for example
every response was an "8". Each scenario had similar numbers of low quality responses. Scenario 6 had fewer low
quality responses, a result consistent with the lower number of total surveys. Retaining these responses in the analysis
increased the error associated with the results and thus strengthened the evidence for any significant findings.
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Table 4.1: Participant and U.S. Population Demographics
Characteristic Participant Population
Median Age 31-35 range 37.9 years
Percent Female 37.9% 50.8%
Median Income $50-62K range 57,617
Democrat/Indep/Republican 34/49/17% 27/42/28%
All population data except political affiliation are from the
U.S. Census Bureau for 2016.
Political affiliation data are from Gallup poll responses con-
temporaneous with the researcher’s survey.
4.4.2 Experimental Factors
4.4.2.1 Situation
Each treatment presented the participant with a situation wherein a country facing a crisis re-
quested assistance from the United States. In response, the United States chose to send military
forces to conduct noncombat efforts to provide the assistance. The treatments varied the purpose
of the mission, the group receiving assistance, and the cost of providing assistance.
4.4.2.2 Humanitarian
To vary the purpose of the operation as either humanitarian or for national security, the treat-
ments included one of two statements:
1. The United States has a long-term interest in the success of a foreign government. The target
country’s location is of strategic importance. The position allows it to ensure trade routes
critical to the U.S. economy remain open. Loss of control of the trade routes could result
in a dire economic decline in the U.S. economy. The target country is also the only source
of a mineral used for US national defense. Loss of cooperation between the countries could
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leave the United States without access to the strategic resource.
The target country is under threat from an insurgency with ties to attacks on western inter-
ests. The intent of the insurgency is to overthrow and replace the current government. If the
insurgency takes control, experts do not expect a humanitarian crisis, but they do believe the
target country will become a base for exporting violence against the United States and other
western countries.
2. A severe natural disaster struck a foreign country, killing more than 10,000 people in less
than twenty-four hours. Without massive international assistance, experts estimate 50,000
more people will die in the next week and more than 100,000 people will die before the
situation stabilizes.
4.4.2.3 HighCost
To experimentally manipulate costs, the research contrasted a scenario with both high human
(casualties) and financial costs relative to having the military force remain at its home station with
one wherein the costs were similar to those of remaining at the home station5:
1. The financial cost of the deployment is nearly identical to the cost of training the U.S. force
without deploying them because the target country will provide support, within its capabil-
ities, to the U.S. military operation. U.S. military and political leaders are happy with the
target country’s level of support.
The U.S. military does not expect deaths or injuries beyond the accidental levels expected
5The use of the novel relative measure of costs to those of remaining at the home station provided three key benefits.
First, it avoided the introduction of ambiguity related to absolute measures of cost. People often find comprehending
large numbers, such as the costs of conflict, very difficult (Landy, Silbert and Goldin (2013); Barrio, Goldstein and
Hofman (2016)). Use of the relative measure negated the need to use difficult-to-grasp numbers. Second, it provided
some perspective for determining if the cost should be considered high or low. Without a reference, someone may
consider an operation high cost if told its expenses were $10 million. If the participant was unaware the alternative
cost $100 million, he or she would not recognize the former as the low cost option. Finally, it provided an easily
accessible benchmark from which the participants could assess deviation. The benefits of the relative metric remain
when human costs are the measures.
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during peacetime operations at a home station because the forces are deploying into a coop-
erative environment.
2. The process of deploying the force into a foreign country and executing the mission there
imparts significant costs on the American people. U.S. military leaders expect the training
in the target country to be many times more expensive than training at a home station. As
well, training the military of the target country reduces the opportunity for the U.S. forces to
improve their own capabilities.
Finally, having U.S. forces train the target country’s military significantly increases risks for
the U.S. force. U.S. military and political leaders expect deaths and injuries to occur during
the operation. Leaders expect the numbers of dead and injured to be much higher than would
exist if the U.S. military remained at its home station.
4.4.2.4 MilRecipient
Finally, the experiment varied the recipients of assistance. Participants received a treatment
indicating development of civilian capabilities or military capabilities:
1. The target country needs to rebuild its civilian infrastructure and governance capabilities.
The political leadership of the target country requested, and U.S. leaders intend to send, a
large U.S. military force into the country to conduct a wide-ranging effort to improve the
capabilities of the target nation’s hospitals, transportation networks, and law enforcement
practices. The U.S. military has the ability to assist the target country in each of these areas.
Leaders of both the target country and the United States want this deployment to improve
capabilities and relations.
The U.S. force will not be working with the target nation’s military, nor will it engage in any
combat operations during the deployment.
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2. The political leadership of the target country requested, and U.S. leaders intend to send, a
large U.S. military force into the country to conduct a noncombat mission to improve the
military capabilities of the target country. The missions include exchanges of ideas and
training concepts at all levels from junior military members to senior leaders.
The U.S. force will not engage in any combat operations during the deployment. Leaders of
both the target country and the United States want this deployment to improve capabilities
and relations.
4.4.3 Parsing Operational Code Beliefs
In addition to the experimental factors, the survey asked several additional questions. The ques-
tions explored the participant’s personal belief set. Some of the questions addressed the expected
success level for the mission, and the short- and long-term difference in the situation the action
will make. Other questions addressed the importance of human costs, financial costs, and demo-
graphics.
A principal component factor analysis on several of these variables generated two identifiable
latent concepts. The rotated factor weights are in Table 4.2.
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Table 4.2: Factor Analysis Rotated Weights
Variable Instrumental1 Instrumental2
Expected level of success for the mission 0.8578 -0.0556
Difference the mission makes in the short run 0.7418 -0.0880
Difference the mission makes in the long run 0.8424 -0.0123
Acceptability of using the military for noncombat operations 0.7579 -0.0004
Military capability to execute a broad range of operations 0.7815 0.1196
Effects of human costs for this mission 0.1071 0.8430
Effects of monetary costs for this mission -0.1301 0.8317
Eigen Value 3.20922 1.42773
The survey data for this experiment focused on the influence of practical elements on public
support. As a result, the personal belief set variables separated into factors corresponding to two
different instrumental operational code beliefs. Instrumental1 weighted questions related to in-
strumental operational code beliefs about the effectiveness of the action. The first variable, expsucc
was the response to the question, "How likely to be successful do you think this mission will be?"
A score of zero indicated "Unsuccessful" while a 10 indicated "Successful." The msnsrt variable
was the score the participant gave in response to the question "How much of a difference do you
expect this mission to make in the short run?" Similarly, the msnlng variable was the response
to "How much of a difference do you expect this mission to make in the long run?" The variable
ncbtuse recorded the level of agreement with the statement, "The United States should use its
military in non-combat environments to pursue national interests." A zero score indicated "Com-
pletely Disagree" while "Completely Agree resulted in a score of 10. Finally, broadmil measured
agreement with the statement, "The US military can achieve success conducting missions across
a broad spectrum spanning from civilian capability development to warfighting." using the same
scale. Table 4.3 shows the heavily weighted questions by operational code belief.
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Table 4.3: Operational Code Belief by Heavily Weighted Questions
Factor Result Survey Questions Related Questions from George (1969)
Instrumental1 How likely to be successful do you think How are goals pursued most effectively?
this mission will be?
How much of a difference do you expect What is the utility and role of different
this mission to make in the short run? means?
How much of a difference do you expect What is the utility and role of different
this mission to make in the short run? means?
The United States should use its military What is the utility and role of different
in non-combat environments to pursue means?
national interests.
The US military can achieve success How are goals pursued most effectively?
conducting missions across a broad
spectrum spanning from civilian
capability development to warfighting.
Instrumental2 When thinking of the costs of the mission, How are risks calculated/controlled/
how important to you is risk of injury or accepted for political action?
death in the way you determine cost?
When thinking of the costs of the mission, How are risks calculated/controlled/
how important to you is the financial accepted for political action?
element of cost?
The second factor was a straight forward measure of costs. The first variable, death6, recorded
the responses to the question, "When thinking of the costs of the mission, how important to you is
risk of injury or death in the way you determine cost?" Answering "Not Important" resulted in a
zero score scaling up to 10 with a response of "Highly Important." The question "When thinking
of the costs of the mission, how important to you is the financial element of cost?" produced the
variable finance using the same scale.
6It is important to recognize the anyhum measure in Experiments 1 and 2 asked a philosophical question about
the importance of human costs generally, a measure of the participant’s values. The mission-specific nature of this
question makes it a pure cost measure rather then a value measure. As well, the latent concept unveiled by this factor
analysis was exclusively about measurable costs while the factor loading of death in the previous experiments linked
to questions about morality, helping, and how the participant felt.
82
4.5 Modeling the Relationship Between the Situation and a Personal Belief Set
Exploring the relationship between the situation and a personal belief set required the use of
several models. The first model addressed the direct influence of situation factors on public sup-
port.
Support =β1Humanitarian+ β2MilRecipient+ β3HighCost+ β4Humanitarian×MilRecipient
+ β5Humanitarian×HighCost+ β6MilRecipient×HighCost
+ β7Humanitarian×MilRecipient×HighCost+ β8Constant+ 
The Situation model assessed whether the experimental factors or any of their interactions influ-
enced the level of support for the response to the crisis in the scenario. Each variable was categor-
ical as the section on the experimental factors discussed.
The Personal Belief Set model assessed whether the operational code belief variables had direct
influence on public support.
Support =β1Instrumental1 + β2Instrumental2 + β3Constant+ 
Finally, the Full model combined the Situation and Personal Belief Set models.
Support =β1Humanitarian+ β2MilRecipient+ β3HighCost+ β4Instrumental1 + β5Instrumental2
+ β6Humanitarian×MilRecipient+ β7Humanitarian×HighCost
+ β8MilRecipient×HighCost+ β9Humanitarian×MilRecipient×HighCost
+ β10Constant+ 
This model allowed an exploration of how the Personal Beliefs Set variables altered the influence
of the situation factors7.
7Demographic variables including sex, age, income, and military participation were not significant in any model.
Similarly, the participant’s position on a spectrum from "Staunchly Liberal" to "Staunchly Conservative" was not
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4.6 Results
The purpose of the experiment was to determine if the experiment factors influenced the sup-
port for noncombat operations. Figure 4.2 presents the mean, standard deviation, and number of
participants for each scenario and Figure 4.3 presents the same information by experiment factor.
Type III ANOVA analysis was appropriate for examining the Situation model. Type III ANOVA
calculates the sum of squares for each factor given the levels of other factors and all interactions.
It is appropriate when the data are unbalanced, as is the case for this experiment. All of the anal-
yses used Helmert contrasts for the factor variables. Helmert contrasts are appropriate to create
orthogonal factors from unbalanced data. Consequently, the Helmert contrast was proper for the
analyses. Table 4.3 shows the results of the ANOVA on the Situation model indicate all three fac-
tors influenced public support. Figure 4.4 depicts the effects of the factors on Support graphically.
Figure 4.2: Support Scores by Scenario
significant.
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Figure 4.3: Support Scores by Factor and Level
Table 4.4: Experiment 3 ANOVA
Dependent variable:
Support
Sum Sq Df F value Pr(>F)
Humanitarian 165 1 25.9631 4.338e− 07∗∗∗
HighCost 552 1 86.6993 < 2.2e− 16∗∗∗
MilRecipient 32 1 4.9982 0.02565∗∗
Humanitarian×MilRecipient 5 1 0.8423 0.35902
Humanitarian×HighCost 3 1 0.4389 0.50782
MilRecipient×HighCost 0 1 0.0001 0.99323
Humanitarian×MilRecipient 20 1 3.1190 0.07776∗
×HighCost
(Intercept) 35572 1 5588.8573 < 2.2e− 16∗∗∗
Residuals 5130 806
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Figure 4.4: Effects of Factors on Support
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The ANOVA results indicated the factors were influential, but regression analysis can provide
further insight into the influence of the factors and of the other model elements the survey captured.
The results of regression analysis on all four models are in Table 4.4.
Table 4.5: Experiment 3 Model Regression Results
Dependent variable:
Support
Situation Personal Belief Set Full
Humanitarian 0.454∗∗∗ 0.040
(0.089) (0.065)
MilRecipient 0.199∗∗ 0.125∗∗
(0.089) (0.063)
HighCost −0.829∗∗∗ −0.519∗∗∗
(0.089) (0.065)
Instrumental1 1.979
∗∗∗ 1.880∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.065)
Instrumental2 −0.284∗∗∗ −0.202∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.065)
Humanitarian×MilRecipient 0.082 0.054
(0.089) (0.064)
Humanitarian×HighCost 0.059 −0.016
(0.089) (0.064)
MilRecipient×HighCost 0.001 0.002
(0.089) (0.064)
Humanitarian×MilRecipient 0.157∗ 0.098
×HighCost (0.089) (0.063)
Constant 6.654∗∗∗ 6.633∗∗∗ 6.632∗∗∗
(0.089) (0.066) (0.063)
Observations 814 788 788
R2 0.138 0.541 0.581
Adjusted R2 0.131 0.540 0.577
Residual Std. Error 2.523 (df = 806) 1.842 (df = 785) 1.768 (df = 778)
F Statistic 18.476∗∗∗ (df = 7; 806) 463.286∗∗∗ (df = 2; 785) 120.110∗∗∗ (df = 9; 778)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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4.7 Analysis of Results
The ANOVA and regression analysis on the Situation model provided strong evidence for Hy-
potheses 1, 2, and 3. In the cases of Humanitarian and HighCost, the experimental factors
were significant at the p = 0.001 level. MilRecipient was significant at the p = 0.05 level. These
results indicated the participants preferred the humanitarian purpose to the national security pur-
pose, preferred to develop the military of the country of interest over its civilian capabilities, and
preferred the low cost actions.
Examining the regression analysis on the models provided more insights into the details of the
experiment’s findings. As the ANOVA indicated and Figure 4.5 depicts, the Situation model con-
firmed both the significance and directionality of the influence of the factors as being consistent
with expectations. The inclusion of high costs had a negative influence roughly twice the size of
the influence of a humanitarian purpose. Finally, working with the host country’s military was only
about half as influential as having a humanitarian purpose for the operation.
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Figure 4.5: Situation Model Coefficients with 95% Confidence Intervals
The results on the Personal Belief Set model provided strong evidence for Hypothesis 4. Each
of the variables showed direct influence on public support. Figure 4.6 provides the coefficients. The
magnitude of the coefficient for Instrumental1 was statistically larger than that of Instrumental2
at better than the p = 0.001 level. The instrumental operational code belief element related to the
effectiveness of the operation had more influence than costs. This result was consistent with the
expectations of the Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler (2009) framework.
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Figure 4.6: Personal Belief Set Model Coefficients with 95% Confidence Intervals
The Full model provided the ability to assess how the inclusion of the Personal Belief Set model
variables altered the influence of the experimental factors from the baselines set in the Situation
model. Three key aspects of the Full model results required explanation: HighCost’s retention of
significance, the loss of significance for the purpose of the noncombat operation, and reduction in
coefficient magnitude for the preference for military recipients. Figure 4.7 shows the contingent
influence of the factors.
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Figure 4.7: Full Model Coefficients with 95% Confidence Intervals
The variable HighCost retained significance in the Full model despite both human and finan-
cial costs being included in the instrumental operational code belief variables8. The result provided
some evidence for Hypothesis 5. The retained influence and significance resulted from values about
the general preference for lower costs regardless of the ability to specifically account for the ele-
ments of cost.
The loss of significance posed a challenge to Hypothesis 5. A humanitarian purpose should have
retained influence as a values-based preference. The failure to retain influence indicated the par-
ticipants considered the purpose irrelevant after taking instrumental operational code beliefs into
account. In robustness checks, Humanitarian retained influence after removing Instrumental1,
the instrumental operational code belief variable related to the effectiveness of the operation. Re-
moving Instrumental2, related to costs, did not cause a discernible change in the magnitude or
insignificance of Humanitarian when compared to the Full model. These results imply the par-
8In robustness checks, HighCost retained influence even when including death and finance in the models di-
rectly.
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ticipants were concerned with whether the operation worked to resolve the situation regardless of
why it began.
The continued influence ofMilRecipientwas consistent with both Hypothesis 1 and 5. The re-
duction in magnitude indicated some of the influence of MilRecipient in the Situation model was
the result of the participant’s expectation military-to-military interaction would be more effective
or less costly. It’s retained influence indicated participants preferred a military recipient for values
other than effectiveness and costs.
4.7.1 Mediation Analysis
One challenge of this research was assessing the directionality of the relationship between the
situation and the personal beliefs. It is possible the beliefs shaped the interpretation of the situa-
tion. It is also possible the situation activated beliefs associated with it. This reality was why the
arrow between them in the conceptual model was dual headed. For this experiment, the partici-
pants viewed the situation before being asked values-related questions. The arrow traveled from
the situation to the belief set. Mediation analysis was necessary to determine how much effect on
the influence of the situation factors the beliefs variables had.
The analysis required two steps as Imai, Keele and Yamamoto (2010) described. The first step
was to determine if any of the situation factors predicted the values of the belief variables. Ac-
complishing this step required performing a regression using the belief variable as the dependent
variable and the Full model, excluding the belief variable of interest, as the explanatory model.
Analyses of the following equations determined the experiment factors predicted the beliefs. Con-
sequently, assessment of the direct and causal mediation effects was necessary.
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Instrumental1 =β1Humanitarian+ β2MilRecipient+ β3HighCost+ β4Instrumental2
+ β5Humanitarian×MilRecipient+ β6Humanitarian×HighCost
+ β7MilRecipient×HighCost+ β8Humanitarian×MilRecipient×HighCost
+ β9Constant+ 
(4.1)
Instrumental2 =β1Humanitarian+ β2MilRecipient+ β3HighCost+ β4Instrumental1
+ β5Humanitarian×MilRecipient+ β6Humanitarian×HighCost
+ β7MilRecipient×HighCost+ β8Humanitarian×MilRecipient×HighCost
+ β9Constant+ 
(4.2)
The results in Table 4.6 indicatedHumanitarian andHighCost predicted both Instrumental1
and Instrumental2. These results required continuation onto the second step, determining the Av-
erage Causal Mediation Effect (ACME) using the methods in Tingley et al. (2014).
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Table 4.6: Mediation Step 1
Humanitarian 0.204∗∗∗ −0.137∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.036)
MilRecipient 0.036 −0.023
(0.035) (0.035)
HighCost −0.159∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.036)
Instrumental2 0.045
(0.035)
Instrumental1 0.046
(0.036)
Humanitarian×MilRecipient 0.010 −0.078∗∗
(0.035) (0.035)
Humanitarian×HighCost 0.037 0.047
(0.035) (0.035)
MilRecipient×HighCost −0.009 −0.064∗
(0.035) (0.035)
Humanitarian×MilRecipient×HighCost 0.017 −0.049
(0.035) (0.035)
Constant 0.004 −0.008
(0.035) (0.035)
Observations 788 788
R2 0.070 0.048
Adjusted R2 0.061 0.038
Residual Std. Error (df = 779) 0.969 0.981
F Statistic (df = 8; 779) 7.358∗∗∗ 4.859∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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The mediation calculations leveraged 1000 simulations to estimate the ACME using a boot-
strapping technique. The results in Table 4.7 show Instrumental1 mediated bothHumanitarian
and HighCost. Instrumental1 fully mediated Humanitarian,but only mediated 36.5% of the
variance from HighCost. As a result, HighCost maintained direct influence. Instrumental2
mediated Humanitarian, but the mediation had no influence on the effect of Humanitarian on
public support. Finally, Instrumental2 mediated HighCost, but the mediation altered the influ-
ence of HighCost on public support by less than 5%.
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Table 4.7: Mediation Calculation
Estimate 95% Confidence Interval p− value
Mediation by Instrumental1
Humanitarian
Ave. Causal Mediation Effect 0.7576 0.4849-1.02 <2e-16∗∗∗
Ave. Direct Effect 0.0658 -0.1896-0.31 0.69
Total Effect 0.8234 0.4567-1.19 <2e-16∗∗∗
Proportion Mediated 0.9201 0.6892-1.33 <2e-16∗∗∗
HighCost
Ave. Causal Mediation Effect -0.603 -0.861-(-0.34) <2e-16∗∗∗
Ave. Direct Effect -1.048 -1.320-(-0.80) <2e-16∗∗∗
Total Effect -1.651 -2.028-(-1.33) <2e-16∗∗∗
Proportion Mediated 0.365 0.240-0.48 <2e-16∗∗∗
Mediation by Instrumental2
Humanitarian
Ave. Causal Mediation Effect 0.0536 0.0148-0.11 0.004∗∗∗
Ave. Direct Effect 0.0658 -0.1784-0.31 0.662
Total Effect 0.1193 -0.1259-0.37 0.398
Proportion Mediated 0.4489 -4.0010-4.05 0.398
HighCost
Ave. Causal Mediation Effect -0.0500 -0.0960-(-0.02) <2e-16∗∗∗
Ave. Direct Effect -1.0479 -1.3051-(-0.76) <2e-16∗∗∗
Total Effect -1.0979 -1.3531-(-0.82) <2e-16∗∗∗
Proportion Mediated 0.0456 0.0131-0.09 <2e-16∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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4.8 Experiment 3 Conclusion
Experiment 3 provided several insights. First, the public prefers lower costs even when its pref-
erence process includes instrumental operational code beliefs directly related to costs (Hypothesis
3). Second, differences in the situation of military noncombat operation matter to generating pub-
lic support. The public will provide greater support for humanitarian purposes (Hypothesis 1) and
for those providing development to foreign military capabilities (Hypothesis 2).
Experiment 3 also demonstrated the value of operational code beliefs for influencing public sup-
port (Hypothesis 4). Finally, it demonstrated that situation factors can retain influence despite the
inclusion of operational code beliefs when they relate to important values (Hypothesis 5). Costs
have influence as a concept beyond the measurable human and financial costs. The public also
prefers military-to-military engagement over military-to-civilian engagement even after account-
ing for instrumental operational code beliefs related to effectiveness and costs. The participants
did not retain a preference for humanitarian purposes for military noncombat operations. Further
research is necessary to delve into why not.
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5. CONCLUSION
5.1 Purpose
Political leaders in the United States have many policy options available to them when a crisis
occurs. Two of those options involving the use of the military in response are combat operations
and noncombat operations. Combat involves the use of violence to compel another to act in a
desired fashion. Noncombat operations leverage the capabilities of the military to provide human-
itarian assistance or to improve institutional capacity of a foreign country. A decision to use one
or the other in response to a situation is a foreign policy choice.
Scholars have a long history of researching the factors influential in determining American for-
eign policy preferences. Different aspects of foreign policy had unique aspect-related factors, but
one common factor was the need for public support. This research effort explored two questions.
The first asked, "What factors influence the public support of U.S. military noncombat operations?"
The second then asked, "Do the factors influencing support for U.S. military noncombat operations
differ from those of combat operations?" From the results of the experiments, the answers to those
questions were clear. First, both situational factors and personal belief sets influence public sup-
port for noncombat operations and, second, the factors related to support for military noncombat
operations did not differ from those of combat.
5.2 Framework
The Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler (2009) framework provided an initial structure for considering
the questions. Their framework, however, was generalizable to encompass a broader array of
concepts. The generalized framework in Figure 5.1 allowed improved analysis of the factors going
into determining public support.
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Figure 5.1: Conceptual Model of the Influence of the Situation and a Personal Belief Set on Public
Support. Adapted from Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler (2009).
While Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler (2009) identified success expectation and the morality of acting
as influential on casualty tolerance and subsequently on public support, those elements were ex-
amples of personal beliefs. The first fell into the category of instrumental operational code beliefs,
those related to ends-means relationships, while the second fell into the category of philosophical
operational code beliefs, those related to the fundamental nature of political things. Success ex-
pectation was important, but the ends-means relationship included more than just success. Using
the instrumental operational code beliefs allowed a wider set of elements to coalesce into the belief
influencing public support. Similarly, philosophical operational code beliefs include the morality
of acting, but also included other concepts of political right and wrong.
5.3 Findings in the Research
This research used three experiments totaling more than 3,000 participants to explore factors
influencing public support for different policy preferences. The experiments generated insights
into the factors influencing public support for U.S. military noncombat operations and whether
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they differ from those related to public support of combat operations. Across all three experiments
the results indicated both the specifics of the situation and the respondent’s beliefs influenced the
level of support.
5.3.1 Situation Factors
In each experiment, situation factors, when assessed without considering the personal belief
set, had influence over the level of public support. Some of the experiment results, such as the
importance of SuccessLevel in the first experiment and of HighCost in the third, demonstrated
the public’s ability to apply rational cost-benefit analysis to foreign policy decision making. Other
results, such as the importance of human costs in the first experiment and the importance of the
relationship between countries in the second experiment, indicated values also had influence. The
combined results demonstrated the specifics of the situation under assessment was important to the
level of public support, validating their linkage in the conceptual model.
One critical finding in both the first and second experiment related to the policy preference
between combat and noncombat. When overall values were not taken into account, the public
showed no preference between combat and noncombat responses. The results implied the partici-
pants did not care what policy option the United States chose for dealing with the situation; other
factors generated the difference in public support. Success and human costs mattered in the first
experiment while the relationship and level of sympathy mattered in the second. The apathy to-
ward combat was particularly important due to its conflict with the results of the combined models.
5.3.2 Personal Belief Sets
In each survey, the personal beliefs of the participants influenced public support1. The beliefs
related to the ends-means relationship, the instrumental operational code belief, held the most in-
1The second model in each chapter "ignored" the experiment and treated the participants exclusively as survey
respondents to explore the personal belief set.
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fluence in every case. Philosophical operational code beliefs also had influence over the level of
public support for an action, but its influence was a fraction of the former. The third experiment did
not include philosophical operational code beliefs, but even in a comparison between instrumental
operational code beliefs, the variable related to the effectiveness of the action was more influential
than one related to costs. Across the three surveys the personal belief set had independent influ-
ence on the level of public support, a result indicating the conceptual model’s relationship between
beliefs and public support was valid.
5.3.3 Combined Models
The combined models showed three consistent results. First, the personal belief set variables
always maintained their influence with minor changes in its power. Second, the situation factors
showed dramatically different results after accounting for beliefs. These results, along with the
mediation analyses, indicated the influence of the beliefs was relatively consistent and accounting
for them altered the causal linkage between the situation factors and public support. This finding
indicated the contingent influence arrow in the conceptual model was valid.
The third consistent result was strength of the influence of instrumental operational code be-
liefs. The influence of the variables related to the effectiveness of the operations was several times
the influence of the philosophical operational code belief variable2. Further, the instrumental oper-
ational code belief variable related to effectiveness was the most influential element in each of the
combined models. These results were consistent with the Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler (2009) findings.
Another result from the combined models was not as consistent, but did comport with predic-
tions in most cases. The situation factors retaining direct influence were associated with elements
the population would endow with infinite value, as Tetlock et al. (2000) discussed. In the first
two experiments, the preference for noncombat operations became significant after accounting for
2This trend existed in the Personal Belief Set model and continued in the Full model.
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beliefs despite the Situation model failing to show causal influence. This was an indication the
participants normatively preferred noncombat in response to a crisis. In the first experiment, the
participants preferred financial costs over human costs even after including a question about the
importance of human costs in military operations as part of the factor analysis. This result indi-
cated the human costs were normatively more valuable. In the second experiment, all three of the
experiment factors retained influence, as each related to important values, friendship, sympathy,
and noncombat solutions.
The third experiment posed a challenge to the idea normatively infinitely valuable situation
factors would remain influential after accounting for beliefs. The preference for a humanitarian
purpose for a noncombat mission was no longer significant after accounting for instrumental be-
liefs. Further assessment indicated the the effectiveness of the operation mattered, regardless of the
humanitarian or national security purpose of it. This result was counter to the expectation saving
lives would result in retained influence for a humanitarian purpose.
5.4 Implications
The power of the instrumental operational code beliefs, the variable reflecting the effectiveness
of the ends-means linkage, was the strongest and most consistent result in the research. Not only
was the belief variable interdependently influential, it altered the influence of situational factors.
These results have important implications for political leaders desiring public support for foreign
policy actions. First, because effectiveness matters to the public, leaders must set clear expec-
tations about what the policy will accomplish. The results, therefore, support the literature on
framing in international relations (Kahneman and Tversky (1984); Frisch (1993); Busby, Flynn
and Druckman (2018)). Specifically, the evaluative framing of Mintz and Geva (1997) and Mintz
and Redd (2003) is relevant. Evaluative framing can provide an "anchor in the assessment of the
environment, and can shift the meaning of the policy debate." Leaders must provide an anchor of
expectations about the effectiveness of the policy the United States will undertake. The public will
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assess its perception of the effectiveness of the action against the anchor.
Realistically establishing the anchor will be important. A leader may wish to under promise
effectiveness to establish a low hurdle for success, but doing so risks failing to generate sufficient
support. This research found making a difference in the short and long run to be influential on
public support. If the public does not find the ends-means balance valuable, support will suffer.
Conversely, over promising effectiveness to garner support for an action is an option, but this re-
search indicated doing so risks political backlash if the reality does not meet expectations. The
political challenges resulting from President George W. Bush’s "Mission Accomplished" speech
provide an example of such blow back. One year after the speech many perceived the United States
as having "had a plan, which turned out to be a pretty good plan, for winning the war, but they had
no plan for winning the peace." As a result, poll numbers for the president hit their lowest level to
date a year after the speech (Robberts (2004)).
The second implication relates to the opportunities more likely to garner public support. First,
the the public generally supports assisting a country with whom the United States has a friendly
relationship, a result consistent with broader in-group literature (Mercer (1995); Lyall (2010)).
Second, the public prefers getting involved when the situation generates sympathy for the country
of interest. These facts lead to policy opportunities. The United States should consider high sym-
pathy situations as compelling action when the victim is a friend and as a strategic opportunity if
the victim is not. Across those opportunities, the public prefers noncombat and military-to-military
interactions, but not at the cost of successfully accomplishing the objectives of the action.
Leaders have the ability to influence the success of actions through resource decisions. For
example, President Obama directed significant resources to West Africa in response to the Ebola
outbreak there in 2014. However, in his September 16, 2014 speech he stated the crisis was becom-
ing worse referring to it as "an epidemic the likes of which we have not seen before." In response,
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he directed an increase in the military resources responding to the crisis including establishing a
military command center in Africa to coordinate local civilian efforts there and an airlift system
to rapidly deliver medical personnel and supplies to the area. As a result, Ebola cases peaked in
November and rapidly declined by January of 20153 (Obama (2014); Center for Disease Control
(2017)). The level of military participation in the Iraq War provides another example. In February
of 2003, then U.S. Army Chief of Staff, General Eric Shinseki, told the Senate Armed Services
Committee the occupation of Iraq following the end of major combat operations would require "on
the order of several hundred thousand soldiers." The Bush administration instead chose to use a
much smaller force. While it is not possible to prove a larger force would have achieved success,
the more limited resources failed to pacify the Iraqi population and consequently failed to achieve
the administration’s stated objectives.
5.5 Future Research
The results of these experiments opened up avenues for future research. One avenue to pursue
relates to how elite attitudes relate to public attitudes. If the preference forming processes include
similar factors, public research could serve to provide insights applicable to elite decision makers.
A second avenue to research is the influence of elite political leaders and media sources as informa-
tion providers as compared to peers or other source types on foreign policy preferences. The third
avenue to pursue stemmed from the effectiveness of the operational code beliefs in the models. It is
possible emotional processing of foreign policy decisions could be modeled similarly. Recent in-
sights from neurobiology about how the brain processes information under emotional stress could
be incorporated into the interactionist model. Costs, benefits, beliefs, values, and emotions in a
single model could provide greater accuracy for understanding the complex process of forming
preferences on foreign policy questions.
3The American response was not limited to the military, but the military provided the largest portion of personnel
and resources to the effort.
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Appendix A: Research Design and Material for Experiment 1  
This experiment will follow a 2 x 2 x 2 design.  
 
 
 Combat Operations Non-Combat Operations 
 
 Success 
Low % 
Success 
High % 
Success 
Low % 
Success 
High % 
Human Cost Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 5 Scenario 6 
Financial Cost Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 7 Scenario 8 
 
 
 
Screen 1- will show the Information Sheet and this introduction: 
Introduction  
You are about to read a scenario about a fictional U.S. military operation. The scenario does not 
relate to any actual current or historical event. The scenario will provide you information to 
allow you to form opinions regarding the situation. You will then be asked about your opinions. 
Honestly conveying whatever opinion you form is the right answer.  
Screen 2- will provide one of eight scenarios:  
The scenarios draw on work from two separate literatures. The first is foreign aid literature. 
Research by Tarnoff, Paxton and Knack, Chong and Gradstein, and Milner and Tingley provide 
the background on trends in the public support of foreign aid. The second is conflict literature. 
Research into the influence of justifications for conflict and the implications of costs on public 
support for conflict come from Jentleson, Geva, Gartner, and Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler. 
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Scenario 1 
Country B recently attacked its neighbor, Country A. The attack weakened the military 
forces of Country A allowing Country B to occupy and control the area it invaded.  
 
Country A asked for help with the situation. In response, the United States military 
deployed a large and capable combat force to the area. In cooperation with Country A, the U.S. 
military will conduct combat operations using any force necessary to drive Country B from the 
territory it occupied.  
 
Despite the combined efforts of the United States and Country A to force Country B from 
the territory it took, the probability they will be able to achieve their objectives is low, estimated 
to be 10%. Country B is likely to remain in control of the territory it invaded for the foreseeable 
future.  
 
Strong support from international organizations will result in full payment for U.S. 
military participation, equipment, etc. used in the crisis response. In effect, the financial cost to 
the United States will be no different than leaving the forces at home to train. The human cost in 
casualties, however, is expected to be significantly higher than leaving the American personnel 
at home. The vast majority of the costs to the United States will be human costs (casualties) 
rather than financial ones.  
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Scenario 2 
Country B recently attacked its neighbor, Country A. The attack weakened the military 
forces of Country A allowing Country B to occupy and control the area it invaded. 
 
Country A asked for help with the situation. In response, the United States military 
deployed a large and capable combat force to the area. In cooperation with Country A, the U.S. 
military will conduct combat operations using any force necessary to drive Country B from the 
territory it occupied.  
 
With the combined efforts of the United States and Country A aimed at forcing Country 
B from the territory it took, the probability they will be able to achieve their objectives is high, 
estimated to be 90%. The resulting strategic situation will restore the previous border while 
reducing Country B’s ability to threaten its neighbor for the foreseeable future.  
 
Strong support from international organizations will result in full payment for U.S. 
military participation, equipment, etc. used in the crisis response. In effect, the financial cost to 
the United States will be no different than leaving the forces at home to train. The human cost in 
casualties, however, is expected to be significantly higher than leaving the American personnel 
at home. The vast majority of the costs to the United States will be human costs (casualties) 
rather than financial ones.  
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Scenario 3 
Country B recently attacked its neighbor, Country A. The attack weakened the military 
forces of Country A allowing Country B to occupy and control the area it invaded. 
 
Country A asked for help with the situation. In response, the United States military 
deployed a large and capable combat force to the area. In cooperation with Country A, the U.S. 
military will conduct combat operations using any force necessary to drive Country B from the 
territory it occupied.  
 
Despite the combined efforts of the United States and Country A to force Country B from 
the territory it took, the probability they will be able to achieve their objectives is low, estimated 
to be 10%. Country B is likely to remain in control of the territory it invaded for the foreseeable 
future.  
Experts assess the nature of fighting and environment will result in few casualties during 
any effort to retake the captured territory. Specifically, few, if any, American casualties will 
occur. In effect, there will be no human cost (casualties) to the United States’ actions beyond 
those expected had the personnel remained at their home stations to train. The financial cost of 
the operation, however, will be significantly higher than leaving the forces at home. The vast 
majority of the costs to the United States will be financial costs rather than human costs 
(casualties). 
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Scenario 4 
Country B recently attacked its neighbor, Country A. The attack weakened the military 
forces of Country A allowing Country B to occupy and control the area it invaded.  
 
Country A asked for help with the situation. In response, the United States military 
deployed a large and capable combat force to the area. In cooperation with Country A, the U.S. 
military will conduct combat operations using any force necessary to drive Country B from the 
territory it occupied.  
 
With the combined efforts of the United States and Country A aimed at forcing Country 
B from the territory it took, the probability they will be able to achieve their objectives is high, 
estimated to be 90%. The resulting strategic situation will restore the previous border while 
reducing Country B’s ability to threaten its neighbor for the foreseeable future.  
 
Experts assess the nature of fighting and environment will result in few casualties during 
any effort to retake the captured territory. Specifically, few, if any, American casualties will 
occur. In effect, there will be no human cost (casualties) to the United States’ actions beyond 
those expected had the personnel remained at their home stations to train. The financial cost of 
the operation, however, will be significantly higher than leaving the forces at home. The vast 
majority of the costs to the United States will be financial costs rather than human costs 
(casualties). 
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Scenario 5 
Country B recently attacked its neighbor, Country A. The attack weakened the military 
forces of Country A allowing Country B to occupy and control the area it invaded. 
 
Country A asked for help with the situation. In response, the United States approved 
increased sales of military equipment at reduced cost, the transfer of excess defense equipment, 
and the deployment of a large number of personnel in a non-combat role to improve the training 
and capabilities of Country A’s military.  
 
Despite the combined efforts of the United States and Country A to force Country B from 
the territory it took, the probability they will be able to achieve their objectives is low, estimated 
to be 10%. Country B is likely to remain in control of the territory it invaded for the foreseeable 
future.  
 
Strong support from international organizations will result in full payment for U.S. 
military participation, equipment, etc. used in the crisis response. In effect, the financial cost to 
the United States will be no different than leaving the forces at home to train. The human cost in 
casualties, however, is expected to be significantly higher than leaving the American personnel 
at home. The vast majority of the costs to the United States will be human costs (casualties) 
rather than financial ones.  
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Scenario 6 
Country B recently attacked its neighbor, Country A. The attack weakened the military 
forces of Country A allowing Country B to occupy and control the area it invaded. 
 
Country A asked for help with the situation. In response, the United States approved 
increased sales of military equipment at reduced cost, the transfer of excess defense equipment, 
and the deployment of a large number of personnel in a non-combat role to improve the training 
and capabilities of Country A’s military.  
 
With the combined efforts of the United States and Country A aimed at forcing Country 
B from the territory it took, the probability they will be able to achieve their objectives is high, 
estimated to be 90%. The resulting strategic situation will restore the previous border while 
reducing Country B’s ability to threaten its neighbor for the foreseeable future.  
 
Strong support from international organizations will result in full payment for U.S. 
military participation, equipment, etc. used in the crisis response. In effect, the financial cost to 
the United States will be no different than leaving the forces at home to train. The human cost in 
casualties, however, is expected to be significantly higher than leaving the American personnel 
at home. The vast majority of the costs to the United States will be human costs (casualties) 
rather than financial ones.  
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Scenario 7 
Country B recently attacked its neighbor, Country A. The attack weakened the military 
forces of Country A allowing Country B to occupy and control the area it invaded. 
 
Country A asked for help with the situation. In response, the United States approved 
increased sales of military equipment at reduced cost, the transfer of excess defense equipment, 
and the deployment of a large number of personnel in a non-combat role to improve the training 
and capabilities of Country A’s military.  
 
Despite the combined efforts of the United States and Country A to force Country B from 
the territory it took, the probability they will be able to achieve their objectives is low, estimated 
to be 10%. Country B is likely to remain in control of the territory it invaded for the foreseeable 
future.  
 
Experts assess the nature of fighting and environment will result in few casualties during 
any effort to retake the captured territory. Specifically, few, if any, American casualties will 
occur. In effect, there will be no human cost (casualties) to the United States’ actions beyond 
those expected had the personnel remained at their home stations to train. The financial cost of 
the operation, however, will be significantly higher than leaving the forces at home. The vast 
majority of the costs to the United States will be financial costs rather than human costs 
(casualties). 
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Scenario 8 
Country B recently attacked its neighbor, Country A. The attack weakened the military 
forces of Country A allowing Country B to occupy and control the area it invaded. 
 
Country A asked for help with the situation. In response, the United States approved 
increased sales of military equipment at reduced cost, the transfer of excess defense equipment, 
and the deployment of a large number of personnel in a non-combat role to improve the training 
and capabilities of Country A’s military.  
 
With the combined efforts of the United States and Country A aimed at forcing Country 
B from the territory it took, the probability they will be able to achieve their objectives is high, 
estimated to be 90%. The resulting strategic situation will restore the previous border while 
reducing Country B’s ability to threaten its neighbor for the foreseeable future.  
 
Experts assess the nature of fighting and environment will result in few casualties during 
any effort to retake the captured territory. Specifically, few, if any, American casualties will 
occur. In effect, there will be no human cost (casualties) to the United States’ actions beyond 
those expected had the personnel remained at their home stations to train. The financial cost of 
the operation, however, will be significantly higher than leaving the forces at home. The vast 
majority of the costs to the United States will be financial costs rather than human costs 
(casualties). 
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Screen 3 
 
Overall, do you support the United States action in the scenario? 
No (0) – Yes (1) 
 
What is your level of support for the U.S. military operation described in the scenario?  
Do Not Support At All– 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – Fully Support 
 
In this situation, the United States…  
Should Do Less– 0    1    2    3    4    Is Doing About What it Should    6    7    8    9    10 – 
Should Do More 
 
Screen 4 
 
The actions of Country B (the attacker) are… 
Morally Right – 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – Morally Wrong 
 
Helping Country A (the country that was attacked in the situation) would be…  
Highly Immoral – 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – Highly Moral 
 
Considering the situation, how would you feel toward Country A (the country that was attacked) 
before any American involvement? 
Happy for Them – 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – Bad for Them 
 
The United States’ primary response to the situation is… 
Mostly Combat – 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – Mostly Non-Combat 
 
Screen 5 
 
The United States deployed forces primarily to fight the war alongside Country A… 
False – 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – True 
 
The United States deployed forces primarily to train and support Country A’s military… 
False – 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – True 
 
Screen 6 
 
According to the scenario, how successful should the operation be in achieving its objectives?  
Totally Unsuccessful – 0%    10%    20%    30%    40%    50%    60%    70%    80%    90%   
100% – Totally Successful 
 
At what level of expected success would you change your opinion on supporting the American 
operation? (If you currently do not support it, the selected level of success would allow you to 
support it or if you currently support it, the selected level would cause you not to support it.) 
Totally Unsuccessful – 0%    10%    20%    30%    40%    50%    60%    70%    80%    90%   
100% – Totally Successful  
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Screen 7 
 
How much of a difference do you expect this mission to make in the short run?  
No Difference – 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – Important Difference 
 
How much of a difference do you expect this mission to make in the long run?  
No Difference – 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – Important Difference 
 
Screen 8 
 
How important are short run successes in military operations?  
Not Important – 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – Very Important  
 
How important are long run successes in military operations?  
Not Important – 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – Very Important  
 
Screen 9 
 
The majority of costs to the United States in the scenario are…  
Financial Costs – 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – Human Costs (Casualties) 
  
How much benefit does the United States get from participating in this mission? 
None – 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – A Great Deal 
 
Screen 10 
 
Compared to keeping forces at home, the financial costs to the United States in the scenario 
are…  
About the Same– 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – Significantly Higher 
 
Compared to keeping forces at home, the human costs to the United States (casualties) in the 
scenario are…  
About the Same– 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – Significantly Higher 
 
When considering the costs of any military action, how important are financial costs?  
Not At All – 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – Very Important Cost 
 
When considering the costs of any military action, how important are human costs (casualties)?  
Not At All – 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – Very Important Cost 
 
 
Screen 11 
 
If the U.S. military operation in the scenario was completely successful, how much credit would 
you give the political leaders who authorized it? 
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None – 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – Exclusive Credit 
 
If the U.S. military operation in the scenario was completely successful, how much credit would 
you give the military leaders who conducted it? 
None – 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – Exclusive Credit 
 
If the U.S. military operation in the scenario was completely unsuccessful, how much blame 
would you give the political leaders who authorized it? 
None – 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – Exclusive Blame 
 
If the U.S. military operation in the scenario was completely unsuccessful, how much blame 
would you give the military leaders who conducted it? 
None – 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – Exclusive Blame 
 
Screen 12 
 
How much would United Nations pre-approval of American actions increase your support? 
None – 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – A Great Deal 
 
The United States should focus on itself and reduce its involvement with other countries. 
Completely Disagree – 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – Completely Agree 
 
The United States has a responsibility to shape the international environment and to engage with 
other countries. 
Completely Disagree – 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – Completely Agree 
 
Screen 13 
 
How aware are you of United States combat operations? 
Completely Uninformed – 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – Completely Informed 
 
List any current U.S. combat operations about which you know. If you do not know the name of 
the operation provide any descriptive information you have. Descriptive information may include 
the location, important events, programs, or equipment important to the operation. (One 
operation per line.) 
 
How aware are you of United States non-combat operations? 
Completely Uninformed – 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – Completely Informed 
 
List any current U.S. non-combat operations about which you know. If you do not know the 
name of the operation provide any descriptive information you have. Descriptive information 
may include the location, important events, programs, or equipment important to the operation. 
(One operation per line.) 
 
Screen 14 
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Were you ever in the US military? 
No (0) – Yes (1) 
 
Were any of your immediate family members ever in the US military? 
No (0) – Yes (1) 
Screen 15 
 
What is your sex? 
Male (0) – Female (1) 
 
How old are you? 
Younger than 21, 21-25, 26-30, 31-35, 36-40, 41-45, 46-50, 51-55, 56-60, 61-65, Older than 65 
 
What is your household income? 
Less than $25,000; $25,001-37,500; $37,501-50,000; $50,001-62,500; $62,501-75,000, $75,001-
87,500; $87,501-100,000; More than $100,000 
 
Including yourself, how many people does your household income support? 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5 or more 
 
What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
Did Not Complete High School – Completed High School – Some College – Completed 
Vocational School or Professional Apprenticeship – Completed College – Completed Advanced 
Graduate Degree 
Screen 16 
 
Where do you fall on the political spectrum?  
Staunchly Liberal– 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – Staunchly Conservative 
 
Where would you place yourself on the party affiliation spectrum? 
Democrat – 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – Republican 
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Appendix B: Research Design and Material for Experiment 2  
This experiment will follow a 2 x 2 x 2 design.  
 
 Combat Operations Non-Combat Operations 
 
 Sympathy 
Low 
Sympathy 
High 
Sympathy 
Low 
Sympathy 
High 
Friendly 
Relations 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 5 Scenario 6 
Challenging 
Relations 
Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 7 Scenario 8 
 
 
 
Screen 1- will show the Information Sheet and this introduction: 
Introduction  
You are about to read a scenario about a fictional U.S. military operation. The scenario does not 
relate to any actual current or historical event. The scenario will provide you information to 
allow you to form opinions regarding the situation. You will then be asked about your opinions. 
Honestly conveying whatever opinion you form is the right answer.  
Screen 2- will provide one of eight scenarios:  
The scenarios draw on work from two separate literatures. The first is foreign aid literature. 
Research by Tarnoff, Paxton and Knack, Chong and Gradstein, and Milner and Tingley provide 
the background on trends in the public support of foreign aid. The second is conflict literature. 
Research into the influence of justifications for conflict and the implications of costs on public 
support for conflict come from Jentleson, Geva, Gartner, and Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler. 
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Scenario 1 
Country A and Country B have been long-term rivals due to a disagreement about the 
correct placement of their shared border. Following a series of escalating provocations including 
strong words from political leaders and small but tense military standoffs, Country B attacked 
and took control of the portion of the disputed area in Country A.   
 
The United States has friendly relations with Country A. The populations share culture 
and values. The United States and Country A have common economic and political interests 
resulting in regular cooperation in international matters. 
 
Country A asked for help with the situation. In response, the United States military 
deployed a large and capable combat force to the area. In cooperation with Country A, the U.S. 
military will conduct combat operations using any force necessary to drive Country B from the 
territory it occupied.  
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Scenario 2 
A natural disaster recently struck Country A resulting in large numbers of casualties and 
wide-spread damage to its infrastructure and governing capabilities. Country B, its neighbor, 
used the situation as an opportunity to invade Country A based on claims Country A stole lands 
from Country B. This is an absolute lie and Country B is known as an international bully and bad 
actor. The attack came without warning and resulted in large numbers of civilian and military 
casualties in Country A. 
 
The United States has friendly relations with Country A. The populations share culture 
and values. The United States and Country A have common economic and political interests 
resulting in regular cooperation in international matters. 
 
Country A asked for help with the situation. In response, the United States military 
deployed a large and capable combat force to the area. In cooperation with Country A, the U.S. 
military will conduct combat operations using any force necessary to drive Country B from the 
territory it occupied.  
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Scenario 3 
Country A and Country B have been long-term rivals due to a disagreement about the 
correct placement of their shared border. Following a series of escalating provocations including 
strong words from political leaders and small but tense military standoffs, Country B attacked 
and took control of the portion of the disputed area in Country A. 
 
The United States and Country A have a challenging relationship. The populations see 
little common in their cultures and values. At the same time, Country A and the United States 
have few common economic and political interests and rarely cooperate on international matters. 
 
Country A asked for help with the situation. In response, the United States military 
deployed a large and capable combat force to the area. In cooperation with Country A, the U.S. 
military will conduct combat operations using any force necessary to drive Country B from the 
territory it occupied.  
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Scenario 4 
A natural disaster recently struck Country A resulting in large numbers of casualties and 
wide-spread damage to its infrastructure and governing capabilities. Country B, its neighbor, 
used the situation as an opportunity to invade Country A based on claims Country A stole lands 
from Country B. This is an absolute lie and Country B is known as an international bully and bad 
actor. The attack came without warning and resulted in large numbers of civilian and military 
casualties in Country A. 
 
The United States and Country A have a challenging relationship. The populations see 
little common in their cultures and values. At the same time, Country A and the United States 
have few common economic and political interests and rarely cooperate on international matters. 
 
Country A asked for help with the situation. In response, the United States military 
deployed a large and capable combat force to the area. In cooperation with Country A, the U.S. 
military will conduct combat operations using any force necessary to drive Country B from the 
territory it occupied.  
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Scenario 5 
Country A and Country B have been long-term rivals due to a disagreement about the 
correct placement of their shared border. Following a series of escalating provocations including 
strong words from political leaders and small but tense military standoffs, Country B attacked 
and took control of the portion of the disputed area in Country A.  
 
The United States has friendly relations with Country A. The populations share culture 
and values. The United States and Country A have common economic and political interests 
resulting in regular cooperation in international matters. 
 
Country A asked for help with the situation. In response, the United States approved 
increased sales of military equipment at reduced cost, the transfer of excess defense equipment, 
and the deployment of a large number of personnel in a non-combat role to improve the training 
and capabilities of Country A’s military.  
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Scenario 6 
A natural disaster recently struck Country A resulting in large numbers of casualties and 
wide-spread damage to its infrastructure and governing capabilities. Country B, its neighbor, 
used the situation as an opportunity to invade Country A based on claims Country A stole lands 
from Country B. This is an absolute lie and Country B is known as an international bully and bad 
actor. The attack came without warning and resulted in large numbers of civilian and military 
casualties in Country A. 
 
The United States has friendly relations with Country A. The populations share culture 
and values. The United States and Country A have common economic and political interests 
resulting in regular cooperation in international matters. 
 
Country A asked for help with the situation. In response, the United States approved 
increased sales of military equipment at reduced cost, the transfer of excess defense equipment, 
and the deployment of a large number of personnel in a non-combat role to improve the training 
and capabilities of Country A’s military.  
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Scenario 7 
Country A and Country B have been long-term rivals due to a disagreement about the 
correct placement of their shared border. Following a series of escalating provocations including 
strong words from political leaders and small but tense military standoffs, Country B attacked 
and took control of the portion of the disputed area in Country A. 
 
The United States and Country A have a challenging relationship. The populations see little 
common in their cultures and values. At the same time, Country A and the United States have 
few common economic and political interests and rarely cooperate on international matters. 
 
Country A asked for help with the situation. In response, the United States approved 
increased sales of military equipment at reduced cost, the transfer of excess defense equipment, 
and the deployment of a large number of personnel in a non-combat role to improve the training 
and capabilities of Country A’s military.  
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Scenario 8 
A natural disaster recently struck Country A resulting in large numbers of casualties and 
wide-spread damage to its infrastructure and governing capabilities. Country B, its neighbor, 
used the situation as an opportunity to invade Country A based on claims Country A stole lands 
from Country B. This is an absolute lie and Country B is known as an international bully and bad 
actor. The attack came without warning and resulted in large numbers of civilian and military 
casualties in Country A. 
 
The United States and Country A have a challenging relationship. The populations see 
little common in their cultures and values. At the same time, Country A and the United States 
have few common economic and political interests and rarely cooperate on international matters. 
 
Country A asked for help with the situation. In response, the United States approved 
increased sales of military equipment at reduced cost, the transfer of excess defense equipment, 
and the deployment of a large number of personnel in a non-combat role to improve the training 
and capabilities of Country A’s military.  
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Screen 3 
 
Overall, do you support the United States action in the scenario? 
No (0) – Yes (1) 
 
What is your level of support for the U.S. military operation described in the scenario?  
Do Not Support At All– 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – Fully Support 
 
In this situation, the United States…  
Should Do Less– 0    1    2    3    4    Is Doing About What it Should    6    7    8    9    10 – 
Should Do More 
 
Screen 4 
 
The actions of Country B (the attacker) are… 
Morally Right – 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – Morally Wrong 
 
Helping Country A (the country that was attacked in the situation) would be…  
Highly Immoral – 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – Highly Moral 
 
Considering the situation, how would you feel toward Country A (the country that was attacked) 
before any American involvement? 
Happy for Them – 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – Bad for Them 
 
The United States’ primary response to the situation is… 
Mostly Combat – 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – Mostly Non-Combat 
 
Screen 5 
 
The United States deployed forces primarily to fight the war alongside Country A… 
False – 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – True 
 
The United States deployed forces primarily to train and support Country A’s military… 
False – 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – True 
 
The United States actions in the situation are… 
Totally Unjustified – 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – Completely Justified 
 
Screen 6 
 
The United States’ relationship with Country A (the country that was attacked in the situation) is 
best described as…  
Challenging – 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – Friendly 
 
The United States’ and Country A (the country that was attacked in the situation) have common 
interests and values…  
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False – 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – True 
 
What type of relationship with Country A would cause you to change your opinion on supporting 
the American operation? (If you currently do not support it, the selected level of relationship 
would allow you to support it or if you currently support it, the selected level would cause you 
not to support it.) 
Bitter Enemy – 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – Close Friend and Ally 
 
Screen 7 
 
What do you think the chances are the operation will successfully return the situation to the 
conditions before the attack?  
No Chance – 0%   10%    20%    30%    40%    50%    60%    70%    80%    90%    100% – 
Certain 
 
At what level of expected success would you change your opinion on supporting the American 
operation? (If you currently do not support it, the selected level of success would allow you to 
support it or if you currently support it, the selected level would cause you not to support it.) 
Totally Unsuccessful – 0%    10%    20%    30%    40%    50%    60%    70%    80%    90%   
100% – Totally Successful 
 
How much benefit does the United States get from participating in this mission? 
None – 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – A Great Deal 
 
Screen 8 
 
How much of a difference do you expect this mission to make in the short run?  
No Difference – 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – Important Difference 
 
How much of a difference do you expect this mission to make in the long run?  
No Difference – 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – Important Difference 
 
Screen 9 
 
How important are short run successes in military operations?  
Not Important – 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – Very Important  
 
How important are long run successes in military operations?  
Not Important – 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – Very Important  
 
Screen 10 
 
When considering the costs of any military action, how important are financial costs?  
Not At All – 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – Very Important  
 
When considering the costs of any military action, how important are human costs (casualties)?  
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Not At All – 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – Very Important  
 
 
Screen 11 
 
If the U.S. military operation in the scenario was completely successful, how much credit would 
you give the political leaders who authorized it? 
None – 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – Exclusive Credit 
 
If the U.S. military operation in the scenario was completely successful, how much credit would 
you give the military leaders who conducted it? 
None – 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – Exclusive Credit 
 
If the U.S. military operation in the scenario was completely unsuccessful, how much blame 
would you give the political leaders who authorized it? 
None – 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – Exclusive Blame 
 
If the U.S. military operation in the scenario was completely unsuccessful, how much blame 
would you give the military leaders who conducted it? 
None – 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – Exclusive Blame 
 
Screen 12 
 
How much would United Nations pre-approval of American actions increase your support? 
None – 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – A Great Deal 
 
The United States should focus on itself and reduce its involvement with other countries. 
Completely Disagree – 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – Completely Agree 
 
The United States has a responsibility to shape the international environment and to engage with 
other countries. 
Completely Disagree – 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – Completely Agree 
 
Screen 13 
 
How aware are you of United States combat operations? 
Completely Uninformed – 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – Completely Informed 
 
List any current U.S. combat operations about which you know. If you do not know the name of 
the operation provide any descriptive information you have. Descriptive information may include 
the location, important events, programs, or equipment important to the operation. (One 
operation per line.) 
 
How aware are you of United States non-combat operations? 
Completely Uninformed – 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – Completely Informed 
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List any current U.S. non-combat operations about which you know. If you do not know the 
name of the operation provide any descriptive information you have. Descriptive information 
may include the location, important events, programs, or equipment important to the operation. 
(One operation per line.) 
 
Screen 14 
 
Were you ever in the US military? 
No (0) – Yes (1) 
 
Were any of your immediate family members ever in the US military? 
No (0) – Yes (1) 
Screen 15 
 
What is your sex? 
Male (0) – Female (1) 
 
How old are you? 
Younger than 21, 21-25, 26-30, 31-35, 36-40, 41-45, 46-50, 51-55, 56-60, 61-65, Older than 65 
 
What is your household income? 
Less than $25,000; $25,001-37,500; $37,501-50,000; $50,001-62,500; $62,501-75,000, $75,001-
87,500; $87,501-100,000; More than $100,000 
 
Including yourself, how many people does your household income support? 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5 or more 
 
What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
Did Not Complete High School – Completed High School – Some College – Completed 
Vocational School or Professional Apprenticeship – Completed College – Completed Advanced 
Graduate Degree 
Screen 16 
 
Where do you fall on the political spectrum?  
Staunchly Liberal– 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – Staunchly Conservative 
 
Where would you place yourself on the party affiliation spectrum? 
Democrat – 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – Republican 
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Appendix C: Research Design and Material for Experiment 3 
This experiment will follow a 2 x 2 x 2 design. 
 
 
 National Security Humanitarian 
 
 High Cost Low Cost High Cost Low Cost 
Civil 
Development 
 
Scenario 3 
 
Scenario 4 
 
Scenario 5 
 
Scenario 8 
Military 
Development 
 
Scenario 1 
 
Scenario 2 
 
Scenario 6 
 
Scenario 7 
 
Screen 1- will show the Information Sheet and this introduction: 
Introduction  
You are about to read a scenario about a fictional non-combat deployment of US military 
personnel. The scenario does not relate to any actual current or historical event. The scenario will 
provide you information to allow you to form opinions regarding the situation. You will then be 
asked about your opinions. Honestly conveying whatever opinion you form is the right answer.  
Screen 2- will provide one of eight scenarios: 
The scenarios draw on work by Jentleson, and separate work by Geva. 
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Scenario 1 
The United States has a long-term interest in the success of a foreign government. The 
target country’s location is of strategic importance. The position allows it to ensure trade routes 
critical to the US economy remain open. Loss of control of the trade routes could result in a dire 
economic decline in the US economy. The target country is also the only source of a mineral 
used for US national defense. Loss of cooperation between the countries could leave the United 
States without access to the strategic resource. 
The target country is under threat from an insurgency with ties to attacks on western 
interests. The intent of the insurgency is to overthrow and replace the current government. If the 
insurgency takes control, experts do not expect a humanitarian crisis, but they do believe the 
target country will become a base for exporting violence against the United States and other 
western countries. 
The host nation military suffers from high turnover, low motivation, and low 
competence. As a result, individual skills decline rapidly and the host nation’s forces must 
continually train new personnel replacing departing military members. Without improvements in 
the military capabilities of the target country, it is likely the insurgency will be successful in its 
overthrow attempts.  
The political leadership of the target country requested, and US leaders intend to send, a 
large US military force into the country to conduct a non-combat mission to improve the military 
capabilities of the target country. The missions include exchanges of ideas and training concepts 
at all levels from junior military members to senior leaders. The US force will not engage in any 
combat operations during the deployment. Leaders of both the target country and the United 
States want this deployment to improve capabilities and relations. 
The process of deploying the force into a foreign country and executing the mission there 
imparts significant costs on the American people. US military leaders expect the training in the 
target country to be many times more expensive than training at a home station. As well, training 
the military of the target country reduces the opportunity for the US forces to improve their own 
capabilities. 
Finally, having US forces train the target country’s military significantly increases risks 
for the US force. US military and political leaders expect deaths and injuries to occur during the 
operation. Leaders expect the numbers of dead and injured to be much higher than would exist if 
the US military remained at its home station.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 145 
 
 
 
 
Scenario 2 
The United States has a long-term interest in the success of a foreign government. The 
target country’s location is of strategic importance. The position allows it to ensure trade routes 
critical to the US economy remain open. Loss of control of the trade routes could result in a dire 
economic decline in the US economy. The target country is also the only source of a mineral 
used for US national defense. Loss of cooperation between the countries could leave the United 
States without access to the strategic resource. 
The target country is under threat from an insurgency with ties to attacks on western 
interests. The intent of the insurgency is to overthrow and replace the current government. If the 
insurgency takes control, experts do not expect a humanitarian crisis, but they do believe the 
target country will become a base for exporting violence against the United States and other 
western countries. 
The host nation military suffers from high turnover, low motivation, and low 
competence. As a result, individual skills decline rapidly and the host nation’s forces must 
continually train new personnel replacing departing military members. Without improvements in 
the military capabilities of the target country, it is likely the insurgency will be successful in its 
overthrow attempts.  
The political leadership of the target country requested, and US leaders intend to send, a 
large US military force into the country to conduct a non-combat mission to improve the military 
capabilities of the target country. The missions include exchanges of ideas and training concepts 
at all levels from junior military members to senior leaders. The US force will not engage in any 
combat operations during the deployment. Leaders of both the target country and the United 
States want this deployment to improve capabilities and relations. 
The financial cost of the deployment is nearly identical to the cost of training the US 
force without deploying them because the target country will provide support, within its 
capabilities, to the US military operation. US military and political leaders are happy with the 
target country’s level of support.  
The US military does not expect deaths or injuries beyond the accidental levels expected 
during peacetime operations at a home station because the forces are deploying into a 
cooperative environment. 
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Scenario 3 
The United States has a long-term interest in the success of a foreign government. The 
target country’s location is of strategic importance. The position allows it to ensure trade routes 
critical to the US economy remain open. Loss of control of the trade routes could result in a dire 
economic decline in the US economy. The target country is also the only source of a mineral 
used for US national defense. Loss of cooperation between the countries could leave the United 
States without access to the strategic resource. 
The target country is under threat from an insurgency with ties to attacks on western 
interests. The intent of the insurgency is to overthrow and replace the current government. If the 
insurgency takes control, experts do not expect a humanitarian crisis, but they do believe the 
target country will become a base for exporting violence against the United States and other 
western countries. 
The target country needs to improve its civilian infrastructure and governance capabilities 
to alleviate the grievances motivating the insurgency. The political leadership of the target 
country requested, and US leaders intend to send a large US military force into the country to 
conduct a wide-ranging effort to improve the capabilities of the target nation’s hospitals, 
transportation networks, and law enforcement practices. The US military has the ability to assist 
the target country in each of these areas. Leaders of both the target country and the United States 
want this deployment to improve capabilities and relations. 
The US force will not be working with the target nation’s military, nor will it engage in 
any combat operations during the deployment.  
The process of deploying the force into a foreign country and executing the mission there 
imparts significant costs on the American people. US military leaders expect the training in the 
target country to be many times more expensive than training at a home station. As well, training 
the military of the target country reduces the opportunity for the US forces to improve their own 
capabilities. 
Finally, having US forces working in the target country significantly increases risks for 
the US force. US military and political leaders expect deaths and injuries to occur during the 
operation. Leaders expect the numbers of dead and injured to be much higher than would exist if 
the US military remained at its home station.  
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Scenario 4 
The United States has a long-term interest in the success of a foreign government. The 
target country’s location is of strategic importance. The position allows it to ensure trade routes 
critical to the US economy remain open. Loss of control of the trade routes could result in a dire 
economic decline in the US economy. The target country is also the only source of a mineral 
used for US national defense. Loss of cooperation between the countries could leave the United 
States without access to the strategic resource. 
The target country is under threat from an insurgency with ties to attacks on western 
interests. The intent of the insurgency is to overthrow and replace the current government. If the 
insurgency takes control, experts do not expect a humanitarian crisis, but they do believe the 
target country will become a base for exporting violence against the United States and other 
western countries. 
The target country needs to improve its civilian infrastructure and governance capabilities 
to alleviate the grievances motivating the insurgency. The political leadership of the target 
country requested, and US leaders intend to send a large US military force into the country to 
conduct a wide-ranging effort to improve the capabilities of the target nation’s hospitals, 
transportation networks, and law enforcement practices. The US military has the ability to assist 
the target country in each of these areas. Leaders of both the target country and the United States 
want this deployment to improve capabilities and relations. 
The US force will not be working with the target nation’s military, nor will it engage in 
any combat operations during the deployment.  
The financial cost of the deployment is nearly identical to the cost of training the US 
force without deploying them because the target country will provide support, within its 
capabilities, to the US military operation. US military and political leaders are happy with the 
target country’s level of support.  
The US military does not expect deaths or injuries beyond the accidental levels expected 
during peacetime operations at a home station because the forces are deploying into a 
cooperative environment. 
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Scenario 5 
A severe natural disaster struck a foreign country, killing more than 10,000 people in less 
than twenty-four hours. Without massive international assistance, experts estimate 50,000 more 
people will die in the next week and more than 100,000 people will die before the situation 
stabilizes.  
The target country needs to rebuild its civilian infrastructure and governance capabilities. 
The political leadership of the target country requested, and US leaders intend to send, a large 
US military force into the country to conduct a wide-ranging effort to improve the capabilities of 
the target nation’s hospitals, transportation networks, and law enforcement practices. The US 
military has the ability to assist the target country in each of these areas. Leaders of both the 
target country and the United States want this deployment to improve capabilities and relations. 
The US force will not be working with the target nation’s military, nor will it engage in 
any combat operations during the deployment. 
The process of deploying the force into a foreign country and executing the mission there 
imparts significant costs on the American people. US military leaders expect the training in the 
target country to be many times more expensive than training at a home station. As well, training 
the military of the target country reduces the opportunity for the US forces to improve their own 
capabilities. 
Finally, having US forces working in the target country significantly increases risks for 
the US force. US military and political leaders expect deaths and injuries to occur during the 
operation. Leaders expect the numbers of dead and injured to be much higher than would exist if 
the US military remained at its home station. 
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Scenario 6 
A severe natural disaster struck a foreign country, killing more than 10,000 people in less 
than twenty-four hours. Without massive international assistance, experts estimate 50,000 more 
people will die in the next week and more than 100,000 people will die before the situation 
stabilizes. 
The target country’s military is the only local organization with any capacity to provide a 
response and coordinate the relief effort. To be effective, the target country’s military requires 
additional training. Without training, the response will be inefficient and will save fewer lives 
than it could. 
The political leadership of the target country requested, and US leaders intend to send, a 
large US military force into the country to conduct a non-combat mission to improve the military 
capabilities of the target country. The missions include exchanges of ideas and training concepts 
at all levels from junior military members to senior leaders. The US force will not engage in any 
combat operations during the deployment. Leaders of both the target country and the United 
States want this deployment to improve capabilities and relations. 
The process of deploying the force into a foreign country and executing the mission there 
imparts significant costs on the American people. US military leaders expect the training in the 
target country to be many times more expensive than training at a home station. As well, training 
the military of the target country reduces the opportunity for the US forces to improve their own 
capabilities. 
Finally, having US forces train the target country’s military significantly increases risks 
for the US force. US military and political leaders expect deaths and injuries to occur during the 
operation. Leaders expect the numbers of dead and injured to be much higher than would exist if 
the US military remained at its home station. 
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Scenario 7 
A severe natural disaster struck a foreign country, killing more than 10,000 people in less 
than twenty-four hours. Without massive international assistance, experts estimate 50,000 more 
people will die in the next week and more than 100,000 people will die before the situation 
stabilizes. 
The target country’s military is the only local organization with any capacity to provide a 
response and coordinate the relief effort. To be effective, the target country’s military requires 
additional training. Without training, the response will be inefficient and will save fewer lives 
than it could. 
The political leadership of the target country requested, and US leaders intend to send, a 
large US military force into the country to conduct a non-combat mission to improve the military 
capabilities of the target country. The missions include exchanges of ideas and training concepts 
at all levels from junior military members to senior leaders. The US force will not engage in any 
combat operations during the deployment. Leaders of both the target country and the United 
States want this deployment to improve capabilities and relations. 
The financial cost of the deployment is nearly identical to the cost of training the US 
force without deploying them because the target country will provide support, within its 
capabilities, to the US military operation. US military and political leaders are happy with the 
target country’s level of support.  
The US military does not expect deaths or injuries beyond the accidental levels expected 
during peacetime operations at a home station because the forces are deploying into a 
cooperative environment. 
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Scenario 8 
A severe natural disaster struck a foreign country, killing more than 10,000 people in less 
than twenty-four hours. Without massive international assistance, experts estimate 50,000 more 
people will die in the next week and more than 100,000 people will die before the situation 
stabilizes. 
The target country needs to rebuild its civilian infrastructure and governance capabilities. 
The political leadership of the target country requested, and US leaders intend to send, a large 
US military force into the country to conduct a wide-ranging effort to improve the capabilities of 
the target nation’s hospitals, transportation networks, and law enforcement practices. The US 
military has the ability to assist the target country in each of these areas. Leaders of both the 
target country and the United States want this deployment to improve capabilities and relations. 
The US force will not be working with the target nation’s military, nor will it engage in 
any combat operations during the deployment. 
The financial cost of the deployment is nearly identical to the cost of training the US 
force without deploying them because the target country will provide support, within its 
capabilities, to the US military operation. US military and political leaders are happy with the 
target country’s level of support.  
The US military does not expect deaths or injuries beyond the accidental levels expected 
during peacetime operations at a home station because the forces are deploying into a 
cooperative environment. 
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Each participant will receive the same set of questions:  
 
Screen 3 
What is your level of support for the US military operation described in the scenario?  
Do Not Support – 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – Fully Support 
Screen 4 
 
The overall motivation, if you could only pick one, for US involvement in the scenario is to 
improve US national security?  
Completely Disagree – 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – Completely Agree 
 
The overall motivation, if you could only pick one, for US involvement in the scenario is 
humanitarian assistance? 
Completely Disagree – 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – Completely Agree 
 
How much do you think the primary task of the US military in this mission is to improve the 
civilian capabilities of the target country?  
Not The Task – 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – Exactly The Task 
 
How much do you think the primary task of the US military in this mission is to improve the 
military capabilities of the target country?  
Not The Task – 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – Exactly The Task 
 
Screen 5 
 
Compared to keeping US forces at home, how costly do you consider this mission to be?  
Closer To Home Costs – 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – Higher Than Home Costs 
 
When thinking of the costs of the mission, how important to you is the financial element of cost?  
Not Important – 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – Highly Important 
 
When thinking of the costs of the mission, how important to you is risk of injury or death in the 
way you determine cost?  
Not Important – 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – Highly Important 
 
Screen 6 
 
How likely to be successful do you think this mission will be?  
Unsuccessful – 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – Highly Successful 
  
How much did your expectation about the success of the mission influence your support?  
Not At All – 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – A Great Deal 
 
How much of a difference will this mission make in the short run?  
No Difference – 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – Important Difference 
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How much of a difference will this mission make in the long run?  
No Difference – 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – Important Difference 
 
Screen 7 
 
These questions refer to your general opinion regarding the role of US military forces. 
 
The US military can achieve success conducting missions across a broad spectrum spanning 
from civilian capability development to warfighting. 
Completely Disagree – 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – Completely Agree 
 
The United States should use its military in non-combat environments to pursue national 
interests. 
Completely Disagree – 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – Completely Agree 
 
Screen 8 
 
Were you ever in the US military? 
No (0) – Yes (1) 
 
Were any of your immediate family members ever in the US military? 
No (0) – Yes (1) 
 
Screen 9 
 
What is your sex? 
Male (0) – Female (1) 
 
How old are you? 
Younger than 21, 21-25, 26-30, 31-35, 36-40, 41-45, 46-50, 51-55, 56-60, 61-65, Older than 65 
 
What is your household income? 
Less than $25,000; $25,001-37,500; $37,501-50,000; $50,001-62,500; $62,501-75,000, $75,001-
87,500; $87,501-100,000; More than $100,000 
 
Including yourself, how many people does your household income support? 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5 or more 
 
Screen 10 
 
How politically liberal are you?  
Not Liberal – 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – Staunchly Liberal 
 
How politically conservative are you?  
Not Conservative – 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – Staunchly Conservative 
 
 154 
 
Where would you place yourself on the party affiliation spectrum? 
Democrat – 0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 – Republican 
 
Screens 11 
 
Were you eligible to vote in the last election related to an office of the federal government? 
No (0) – Yes (1) 
 
If you were eligible, did you vote in the last election related to an office of the federal 
government? (If not, just click next) 
No (0) – Yes (1) 
 
Do you expect to be eligible to vote in the next election related to an office of the federal 
government? 
No (0) – Yes (1) 
 
If you will be eligible, do you expect to vote in the next election related to an office of the 
federal government? (If not, just click next) 
No (0) – Yes (1) 
 
